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Abstract
Balassa and Samuelson showed that as we move towards richer countries
the measured price level becomes higher. Their proposed explanation was
to appeal to the presence of a service element in most goods.
In this thesis, I begin by introducing an exploring of an alternative can-
didate explanation for the B-S relationship. This explanation is based on
an appeal to mismeasured quality. In the model developed in Chapter 2,
the well-known difficulties surrounding the problem of making a full and
appropriate adjustment for differing quality levels will mean that when the
average quality level consumed is higher in richer countries, this will show
up in the data as spurious difference in price levels, which will imply the
B-S relationship. More interestingly, it also leads to a second testable pre-
diction that is not a prediction of the classic B-S explanation. This second
prediction is tested directly at the end of Chapter 2. In testing this predic-
tion, we are led naturally to explore the foundation of the B-S relationship
at a disaggregate level.
In Chapter 3, we take a purely statistical approach in asking the question:
what is the best statistical description of wealth versus price level relation-
ship for individual products? We arrive at a characterization of the best
statistical description which suggests a natural way of ordering products
relative to the form of this relationship. A striking pattern emerges, accord-
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ing to which products at the one end of the spectrum are almost all manu-
factured goods (designated the ‘M-group’), while products at the other end
of the spectrum are almost all pure services (designated the ‘S-group’).
In Chapter 4 and 5, we return to theory. We propose a separate model for
the S-group in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5 we return to the analysis of Chapter
2, but now we apply the analysis to the M-group only.
Chapter 6 is devoted to exploring the macroeconomic implications of the
B-S relationship. The key idea is that a (fast) growing economy will exhibit
a (substantial) temporary episode of inflation, as measured by conventional
price indices.
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Chapter 1
Introduction: the Balassa-Samuelson
Relationship
The Balassa-Samuelson relationship, first introduced in 19641, links the per
capita income level of a country to a broad price index. Balassa and Samuel-
son showed that as we move towards richer countries the measured price
level becomes higher. This represents an apparent violation of Purchasing
Power Parity (PPP). Their proposed explanation was to appeal to the pres-
ence of a service element in most goods. In other words, there are always
local costs of processing, distributing etc., which will reflect local wage rates,
leading to higher prices in richer countries.
In this thesis, I begin by introducing an exploring of an alternative can-
didate explanation for the B-S relationship. This explanation is based on an
appeal to mismeasured quality. This is an old theme in the industrial or-
ganization literature, which can be traced back to the early hedonic prices
literature (Griliches, 1961), and which has been revived as a focus of interest
in recent work by Pakes (2003, 2005). In the present setting, the well-known
difficulties surrounding the problem of making a full and appropriate ad-
justment for differing quality levels will mean that when the average quality
level consumed is higher in richer countries, this will show up in the data
as spurious difference in price levels.
In the model developed in Chapter 2, it is shown that the mismeasured
quality model will imply the B-S relationship. More interestingly, it also
1It was developed by Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964)
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leads to a second testable prediction that is not a prediction of the classic B-
S explanation. This second prediction is tested directly at the end of Chapter
2. In testing this prediction, we are led naturally to explore the foundation
of the B-S relationship at a disaggregate level. This suggests some consider-
ations which lead to the investigation of Chapter 3.
In Chapter 3, we take a purely statistical approach in asking the ques-
tion: what is the best statistical description of wealth versus price level re-
lationship for individual products? We arrive at a characterization of the
best statistical description which suggests a natural way of ordering prod-
ucts relative to the form of this relationship. A striking pattern emerges,
according to which products at the one end of the spectrum are almost all
manufactured goods, while products at the other end of the spectrum are
almost all pure services. This suggests that it might be appropriate to think
in terms of modelling this ‘services’ group (designated the ‘S-group’) sepa-
rately from the manufactures group (designated the ‘M-group’).
In Chapter 4 and 5, we return to theory. We propose a separate model for
the S-group in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5 we return to the analysis of Chapter
2, but now we apply the analysis to the M-group only.
Chapter 6 is devoted to exploring the macroeconomic implications of the
B-S relationship. The key idea is that a (fast) growing economy will exhibit
a (substantial) temporary episode of inflation, as measured by conventional
price indices.
We begin in this chapter with a review of the literature surrounding the
B-S relationship.
1.1 Literature Review
When countries’ price levels are translated to dollars at prevailing nomi-
nal exchange rates, rich countries tend to have higher price levels than poor
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countries. This is known as the ‘Penn effect’. The Balassa-Samuelson model,
as developed by Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964), argues that this rela-
tionship reflects the fact that rich countries are relatively more productive
in the traded goods sector. Higher productivity in the traded goods sector
implies higher wages in the traded goods sector. Since the domestic price
level of traded goods is equal to the world price level, nontraded goods pro-
ducers must raise their prices to provide the higher wages. With constant
prices of traded goods and higher prices of nontraded goods, the overall
price level must be higher. Empirical tests of the Balassa-Samuelson model
have not led to any consensus on the issue. There is empirical support for
the model when comparisons are made between the set of ‘all poor coun-
tries’ and ‘all rich countries’. However, this effect is not statistically sig-
nificant within either the poor countries group or the rich countries group
(Rogoff (1996), see Figure 1.1).
Figure 1.1: Price Level versus GDP per capita in 1990 (U.S.=1)
Notes: Source: The Penn World Table 1994
Using cross-country evidence, in addition to the Penn effect, I find that,
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controlling for per capita income, income inequality is also correlated with
the national price level. Within countries with lower per capita income, in-
come inequality is positively correlated with the national price level, while
within countries with higher per capita income, the correlation is negative.
The Balassa-Samuelson model is not able to explain this additional fact.
Therefore, we need a new model to provide a full explanation of the fact
that both per capita income and income inequality matter for the national
price level. Chapter 2 offers a new type of explanation for the Penn effect,
and for related regularities linking income inequality with the national price
level.
I build a hedonic pricing model to model explicitly the link between in-
come distribution and choice of product quality within each country. The
central feature of the model is closely analogous to the feature identified by
Pakes (2003) in a micro context: quality cannot be perfectly controlled in the
price index. I link this idea to the fact that income elasticity of quality is
non-negligible and tends to be higher for nontraded goods. Once these two
ideas are combined, the model predicts that per capita income has a posi-
tive impact on the national price level (the Penn effect). Controlling for per
capita income, income inequality has a positive impact on the national price
level within countries with lower per capita income. While within countries
with higher per capita income, the impact is negative. Or in other words,
the effect of income inequality on the national price level is decreasing in
per capita income. Therefore, these model predictions are consistent with
the empirical evidence mentioned previously.
To understand the intuition, it is important to first realize that although
households with higher incomes tend to spend more on all consumption
categories2, consumption categories differ in their income elasticities of quan-
2The consumption categories are the 2-digit COICOP (Classification of Individual
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tity and quality. Here, quantity refers to the number of units consumed by
the households, while quality refers to the desirable characteristic within
each unit of consumption goods, which is reflected in the unit price.3 Empir-
ical evidence such as in Bils and Klenow (2001) combined with the comple-
mentary evidence provided in Chapter 2 shows that: For some categories,
such as food and housing, households with higher income tend to keep the
quantity of the goods they buy constant but buy goods with higher quality.
Thus, the income elasticity of quality is high for these goods while that of
quantity is low. For other categories, such as clothing and footwear, house-
holds with higher income tend to purchase a larger quantity of the goods
with a constant level of quality. Therefore, their income elasticity of quan-
tity is high relative to that of quality. Moreover, the goods with relatively
high income elasticities of quantity, such as clothing and footwear, are more
likely to be traded goods, while those with relatively high income elastic-
ities of quality, such as food and housing, are more likely to be nontraded
goods. The focus of Chapter 2 is to investigate this correlation and make a
sharp contrast between the roles played by the goods with high tradability
and high income elasticity of quantity and the goods with low tradability
and low income elasticity of quantity. As a result, in the model it is as-
sumed that households choose one unit of nontradable vertically differenti-
ated goods with varying quality, which are priced locally by a hedonic price
Consumption according to Purpose) divisions, which are Food and non-alcoholic bever-
ages; Alcoholic beverages, tobacco and narcotics; Clothing and footwear; Housing, wa-
ter, electricity, gas and other fuels; Furnishings, household equipment and routine house-
hold maintenance; Health; Transport; Communication; Recreation and culture; Education;
Restaurants and hotels; Miscellaneous goods and services.
3For example, buying the same meal twice doubles the total expenditure on food. Thus,
the number of meals is the quantity of food. In contrast, a meal with organic ingredients
is more expensive than one with non-organic ingredients. Hence, the ingredients of a meal
count as the quality of food. As for housing, two houses with the same characteristics
worth twice as much as one, while two identical houses that only differ in their locations
have different unit prices. Therefore, the number of houses is quantity and the location of a
house is quality. Similarly, the number of clothes is quantity while whether the clothes are
of a high street brand or a designer brand is quality.
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function; households also choose the quantity of a tradable homogeneous
goods, the price of which is a constant unit price across countries.
The intuition for the Penn effect is that since there is no quality adjust-
ment in the price index, the price level of nontraded goods is just equal to
the average expenditure on the one unit of nontraded goods. Moreover,
given that consumers in the countries with higher per capita income tend
to spend more on nontraded goods, this will imply a higher price level of
nontraded goods. With constant prices of traded goods, the national price
level will be higher in richer countries, which explains the Penn effect.
To understand how income inequality affects the national price level, it
is necessary to know how the national price level is constructed in practice:
In the Penn World Table, which is commonly used for the purpose of cross-
country price comparisons, suppose we want to construct the national price
level for the UK, the first step is to find a base country, say the US. Then we
construct the UK’s bilateral Laspeyres and Paasche price index relative to
the base country. The Laspeyres index and the Paasche index are both the
weighted average of the price ratios of traded goods and nontraded goods
of the UK relative to the US. The weights in the Laspeyres index are given
by the expenditure share of the base country, the US, while the weights in
the Paasche index are given by the expenditure share of the UK. The two in-
dices will be further used to construct the national price level of the UK us-
ing the Geary-Khamis (GK) method as shown in Deaton and Heston (2010).
However, strictly following this method will make the theoretical model in-
tractable. Instead, the geometric mean of the two indices will be used as the
UK’s national price level to mimic the national price level in the Penn World
Table. This is because Deaton and Heston (2010) has shown that the national
price level in the Penn World Table can be very well approximated by the
geometric mean of the bilateral Laspeyres index and the Paasche index.
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The intuition for the impact of income inequality on the national price
level is that income inequality can affect the price level of nontraded goods
by changing the expenditure share on it. This is because according to the
standard IO literature, the price function of vertically differentiated goods
is generally nonlinear and is jointly determined by the distribution of con-
sumers’ attributes and cost function parameters. Keeping per capita income
constant, a higher income inequality implies a more convex price function
of nontraded goods. If the elasticity of substitution between traded goods
and nontraded goods is high, then this will lead to a smaller expenditure
share on nontraded goods. Since in practice, the quality of nontraded goods
cannot be perfectly controlled, the lower expenditure share on nontraded
goods will imply a lower price level of nontraded goods. The Laspeyres
index, which is the average price ratios of traded goods and nontraded
goods relative to the U.S. weighted by the expenditure shares of the U.S.,
will be lower, since the price ratio of nontraded good is lower and there is
no change in the price ratio of traded good and the weights. Thus, income
inequality has a negative impact on the Laspeyres index. However, the im-
pact of income inequality on the Paasche index, which is the average price
ratios of traded good and nontraded goods relative to the U.S. weighted by
the country’s expenditure shares, will depend on the country’s per capita
income relative to the US. With a low enough per capita income, the price
ratio of nontraded good relative to the U.S. will be lower than the price ratio
of traded good relative to the U.S., which is always equal to 1, so a lower ex-
penditure share on nontraded goods will increase the Paasche index. With
a high per capita income, the relative price ratio of nontraded goods will be
higher than the relative price ratio of traded good, hence the lower expen-
diture share on nontraded goods will reduce the Paasche index. Given that
in the model the geometric mean of these two indices is used as a proxy for
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the national price level, with a low enough per capita income, income in-
equality will have a positive impact on the national price level, while with
a high per capita income, the impact is negative.
Therefore, per capita income affects the national price level by chang-
ing the price level of the nontraded goods and income inequality affects the
national price level mainly through its impact on the expenditure share of
nontraded goods. Since the product of the expenditure share and the aver-
age price level of nontraded goods enters the national price level, a higher
per capita income, which increases the average price level of nontraded
goods, will strengthen the effect of income inequality, while a lower in-
come inequality, which increases the expenditure share of nontraded goods,
strengthens the effect of per capita income. Hence the effect of per capita in-
come is decreasing in income inequality and the effect of income inequality
is decreasing in per capita income. Chapter 2 uses disaggregate prices and
expenditure shares at the basic heading level from the International Com-
parison Program (ICP) to show that the intuition provided is consistent with
empirical evidence.
Moreover, since the model predicts that the difference in income inequal-
ity between two countries determines the slope of the relative price schedule
of vertically differentiated goods, the model can generate the implications
for how price differentials of the same good between two countries change
with quality. One important explanation of price differentials of the same
traded good across countries is proposed by Krugman (1987), who refers
to it as “pricing to market”. Since international arbitrage for many types
of goods is difficult or impossible, producers can price discriminate across
different international markets. Due to different price elasticities of de-
mand in different countries, profit-maximizing international firms may set a
country-specific markup. Hence, even prices of the same traded goods can
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be different across countries. However, in the “pricing to market” literature,
only monopolistic competition models are used. This implies that there are
only horizontally differentiated goods in the economy, i.e., all goods have
the same quality. Hence, the price ratio of any good between two countries
must be the same regardless of the quality of that good. However, empiri-
cally the price ratio is not a constant and varies with quality. Chapter 2 tries
to address vertically differentiated goods and shows how income distribu-
tion affects their relative price schedules across countries. More specifically,
it predicts that the difference in income inequality between two countries
determines the slope of the price schedule.
Chapter 2
A ‘Mismeasured Quality’ Interpretation
2.1 The Model
The model is a hedonic pricing model a` la Rosen (1974), in which consumers
and firms choose their optimal positions along an equilibrium price sched-
ule p(z), where z is a vector of characteristics of the product in question.
The focus of the analysis lies in establishing a relationship between a
country’s level of income, and – more importantly – the form of income
distribution in the country, and the pattern of demand for both ‘quality’
goods and ‘commodity’ goods.
The novel prediction of the model is that controlling for per capita in-
come, inequality is correlated with the national price level. The basic intu-
ition is: suppose a country, whose income distribution is made up of three
income groups with equal population, has a perfectly equal income distri-
bution, i.e. all individuals in the top, middle and bottom income groups
have an income level of 100. Given the same Cobb-Douglas utility function,
every one spends a same fraction θ of his/her income on good of the same
quality z. The implied price of the product will be given by the average ex-
penditure on it, which is equal to 100θ. Now consider a mean-preserving
spread of income distribution, under which the top, middle and bottom in-
come groups have income levels of 50, 100 and 150 respectively. The income
redistribution has two effects on the demand of the quality goods. First, it
requires producers to increase the range of qualities to meet the needs of
the newly created rich and poor individuals. Second, it increases the quan-
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tity demanded of the existing top and bottom quality products. As the cost
function of the quality product is convex, the second impact will lead to
higher prices for the existing top and bottom quality products, which will
result in a more convex price function. With a more convex price function
for the quality product and the unit elasticity of substitution of the Cobb-
Douglas utility function, all individuals will respond in this new situation
by spending a smaller fraction θ′ (< θ) of income on the quality product.
As a result, its price level, i.e. the average expenditure on the quality prod-
uct, is now equal to (50θ′ + 100θ′ + 150θ′)/3 = 100θ′, which is less than
before. This is the mechanism through which income inequality affects the
measured national price level in the present model.
2.1.1 The Consumer’s Problem
There is a unit mass of consumers indexed by individual income level c.
The income distribution is assumed (conventionally) to follow a Pareto dis-
tribution characterized by two parameters kc and cm, where cm is the lower
bound of c and kc is the shape parameter. Hence the probability density
function of income is f (c) = kc c
kc
m
ckc+1 , kc > 0, c ∈ [cm,∞).
If we decompose the income elasticity of consumption expenditure into
an income elasticity of quality and an income elasticity of quantity, it will be
shown empirically in what follows that goods differ substantially in their
income elasticities of quality and quantity. We will divide goods into three
types based on the magnitudes of these two elasticities. The first type of
goods, which we call x goods, have zero income elasticity of quality and
a non-zero income elasticity of quantity. The second type, which we call z
goods, have zero income elasticity of quantity and a non-zero income elas-
ticity of quality. For the third type, both elasticities are non-zero. The fact
that some of these elasticities are (close to) zero simply reflects the physical
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nature of the goods, and so we incorporate these features as given param-
eters of the model which follows. We begin with a setting where there are
just two types of goods, x goods and z goods.1 We begin from the idea that
the x goods, which we may think of as simple ‘commodities’, are traded in-
ternationally at a single price. In other words, we assume purchasing power
parity holds for these goods. We simplify notation by choosing the x goods
as a numeraire and normalizing their prices to be 1.
We assume the consumer purchases exactly 1 unit of the quality good.
Subject to this, consumer preferences are given by a standard Cobb-Douglas
utility function v(x, z) = xαzβ, α+ β = 1, where z is the quality level of the
quality good consumed. Maximizing utility subject to the budget constraint
c = x + p(z) yields the consumer’s problem
max
x,z
v(x, z) = xαzβ
s.t. c = x + p(z)
Given the homogeneous feature of x goods and its normalized price, the
total expenditure on x goods is given by the product of quantity consumed
x and its unit price 1. The rest of consumption expenditure will be spent on
z goods, which is assumed to be a nonlinear function of quality z.
The Lagrangian is given by L = xαzβ + λ(c− x− p(z)). First-order nec-
essary conditions imply that
vz
vx
= p′(z)
1The third type of good, which has nonzero income elasticities of both quality and
quantity, can be thought of as a combination of two components, an x component and a z
component.
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hence
β
α
x
z
= p′(z)
since x = c− p(z), we have
c =
α
β
zp′(z) + p(z)
which implies that a consumer chooses a vertically differentiated good
with quality z, then his/her income must be equal to αβzp
′(z) + p(z). We
denote the consumer’s income conditional on choosing quality z by h(z).
Recalled that f (c) denotes the pdf of income c, and that c = h(z) whence
z = h−1(c). From this we can write down the pdf of z, which we denote as
φ(z), as follows:
φ(z) = f (h(z))
∣∣∣∣∂h(z)∂z
∣∣∣∣ (2.1)
where |·| denotes the absolute value and is used to ensure that φ(z) is always
positive even if ∂h(z)/∂z < 0.
The mapping from the pdf of c to the pdf of z can be illustrated in Figure
2.1.
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Figure 2.1: Mapping From Income Distribution to Distribution of Quality
Demanded
Substituting for h(z) and f (·) in (2.1) yields
φ(z) = f (
α
β
zp′(z) + p(z))
∣∣∣∣∣∂(
α
βzp
′(z) + p(z))
∂z
∣∣∣∣∣
= f (
α
β
zp′(z) + p(z))
∣∣∣∣αβ (p′(z) + zp′′(z)) + p′(z)
∣∣∣∣
= kcckcm(
α
β
zp′(z) + p(z))−(kc+1)
∣∣∣∣αβ (p′(z) + zp′′(z)) + p′(z)
∣∣∣∣
If we denote the quantity demanded for the good with quality z by
Qd(z), then the market demand in a small interval dz near quality z is given
by the product of the pdf of quality around z, φ(z), and the length of the
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interval:
Qd(z)dz = kcckcm(
α
β
zp′(z) + p(z))−(kc+1)
∣∣∣∣αβ (p′(z) + zp′′(z)) + p′(z)
∣∣∣∣ dz
2.1.2 The Producer’s Problem
On the supply side, there is a unit mass of firms producing vertically dif-
ferentiated goods indexed by their product quality z. The distribution of
the firms is assumed to be the Pareto distribution characterized by two pa-
rameters kz and zm, where zm is the lower bound of z and kz is the shape
parameter.2 The pdf of z is assumed to take the form:
g(z) = kz
zkzm
zkz+1
, kz > 0, z ∈ [zm,∞)
Producers in all countries are assumed to have the same cost function
∆(M, z) = AzMτzγ, τ > 1,γ > 1, where Az is the productivity parameter
and M denotes the number of units of the product with quality z that the
firm produces. We assume τ > 1 and γ > 1, which ensures that total cost is
a convex function in M and z.
The producers are price takers. Furthermore, it is assumed that the pro-
ducers can vary M but not z. (i.e. a producer’s quality is a given parameter
in the short run). Therefore, the producer’s problem is to maximize profit
by choosing its output level M of the quality good:
2The reasons for using the Pareto distribution are not only that we can get a closed form
solution but also that this assumption is consistent with empirical evidence. Gaffeo et al.
(2003) analyze the average size distribution of a pool of the G7 group firms over the period
1987-2000. They find that the empirical distributions are all consistent with the power law.
In our model, the quality of a firm is a power transformation of the size of the firm, so it is
reasonable to assume quality also follows the Pareto distribution as the Pareto distribution
is close under power transformation.
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max
M
Mp(z)− ∆(M, z)
The first-order conditions imply that
p(z) =
∂∆
∂M
= AzτMτ−1zγ
Thus, M(z) = (
p(z)
Azτzγ
)
1
τ−1
If we denote the firm’s output of the quality good as Qs(z), then the
market supply in a small interval dz near quality z is given by the product
of the pdf of firms around z, the quantity supplied by each z firm and the
length of the interval:
Qs(z)dz = g(z)M(z)dz
Qs(z)dz = kz
zkzm
zkz+1
(
p(z)
Azτzγ
)
1
τ−1 dz
Figure 2.2 shows the relationship between the firms’ qualities z and the out-
put level they produce, M.
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Figure 2.2: Mapping From Firm Distribution to Distribution of Quality Sup-
plied
2.1.3 Market Equilibrium
An equilibrium is defined as a triple {z(c), M(z), p(z)}, where z(c) is the
policy functions for consumers, and M(z) for producers, and the price sched-
ule p(z) such that:
(1) z(c) solves the consumer’s utility maximization problem taking p(z)
as given.
(2) M(z) solves the producer’s profit maximization problem taking p(z)
as given.
(3) Market clears: demand is equal to supply for z goods, i.e., Qs(z) =
Qd(z) for all z.
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2.1.4 Solving Equilibrium
In equilibrium, we must have the market clearing condition Qs(z)dz =
Qd(z)dz. Therefore,
kz z
kz
m
zkz+1 (
p(z)
Azτzγ )
1
τ−1 dz
= kcckcm( αβzp
′(z) + p(z))−(kc+1)
∣∣∣ αβ (p′(z) + zp′′(z)) + p′(z)∣∣∣ dz
kzzkzm ( 1Azτ )
1
τ−1 z−(kz+1)−γ
1
τ−1 p(z)
1
τ−1
= kcckcm( αβzp
′(z) + p(z))−(kc+1)
∣∣∣ αβ (p′(z) + zp′′(z)) + p′(z)∣∣∣ (2.2)
This is a second-order nonlinear non-autonomous differential equation
defining p(z), z ∈ [zm,∞). We impose a boundary condition:
cm =
α
β
zm p′(zm) + p(zm)
Here zm is the lowest quality that is viable in the equilibrium, which is de-
termined by the lowest income cm and the equilibrium price function p(z).
There is no general procedure to obtain the solution of this class of dif-
ferential equations, so we adopt the standard method of undetermined co-
efficients, to find a particular solution. We postulate the equilibrium price
function is of the form p(z) = bzd, with d > 0. We then substitute this form
of solution into the market clearing condition to solve for the values of the
parameter b and d.
The first and second derivatives of the postulated price function form
are
p′(z) = bdzd−1, p′′(z) = bd(d− 1)zd−2 (2.3)
Substituting (2.3) into (2.2) yields
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kzzkzm ( bAzτ )
1
τ−1 z−(kz+1)+(d−γ)(
1
τ−1 )
= kcckcm(b( αβd + 1))
−(kc+1)( αβd
2 + d)bz−d(kc+1)+d−1 (2.4)
Since (2.4) holds for all z and both LHS and RHS are power functions of
z, it must be true that the two parameters of the power functions on both
sides are equal
kzzkzm (
b
Azτ
)
1
τ−1 = kcckcm(b(
α
β
d + 1))−(kc+1)(α
β
d2 + d)b (2.5)
−(kz + 1) + (d− γ) 1
τ − 1 = −d(kc + 1) + d− 1 (2.6)
From (2.6):
d =
kz + γ
(
1
τ−1
)
kc + 1τ−1
(2.7)
Given Equation (2.7), the expenditure share on z goods can be obtained
by
p(z)
c
=
p(z)
α
βzp
′(z) + p(z)
=
bzd
α
βbdz
d + bzd
=
1
α
βd + 1
(2.8)
From (2.7), (2.8) and the fact that Gini = 12kc−1 for the Pareto distribution,
we can derive how the Gini coefficient affects the convexity of the price
function and hence the expenditure share, which is stated in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 (Income Distribution and Expenditure Share) Income inequality
has a positive impact on the expenditure share of x goods and a negative impact on
the expenditure share of z goods. Per capita income has no impact on expenditure
shares.
The intuition behind the proposition is that an increase in the Gini co-
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efficient implies an increase in d and hence a more convex price function.
Since the price of x is 1 and z has a non-linear price function, an increase in
the convexity of the price function of z will make people spend less fraction
of their expenditure on z and more on x due to the high substitutability be-
tween the two goods. This mechanism about how income inequality affects
expenditure share is crucial in determining how income inequality influ-
ences the price level, which will be provided in the next section.
Substituting (2.7) into (2.5) can solve for the other parameter b in the
price function:
b = (
kcckcm( αβ
kz+γ( 1τ−1)
kc+ 1τ−1
+ 1)−kc kz+γ(
1
τ−1)
kc+ 1τ−1
kzzkzm ( 1Azτ )
1
τ−1
)
1
kc+ 1τ−1 (2.9)
Therefore, one solution to the differential equation is
p(z) = bzd = (
kcckcm( αβ
kz+γ( 1τ−1)
kc+ 1τ−1
+ 1)−kc kz+γ(
1
τ−1)
kc+ 1τ−1
kzzkzm ( 1Azτ )
1
τ−1
)
1
kc+ 1τ−1 z
kz+γ( 1τ−1)
kc+ 1τ−1 , z ∈ [zm,∞)
where zm satisfies
cm =
α
β
zm p′(zm) + p(zm)
After obtaining the equilibrium price function, before aggregating it and
analysing how income distribution influences the national price level, we
can first investigate how income distribution affects prices at product level,
i.e. how the difference in income distribution affects the relative price of a
product with a particular quality z0 between two countries.
Suppose the hedonic price functions in country i and country j are pi(z) =
bizdi and pj(z) = bjzdj , where bi, bj, di and dj are determined as in the equi-
librium price function. Then the price ratio of a product with quality z0
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between the two countries is
pi(z0)
pj(z0)
=
bi
bj
z
(di−dj)
0
If we keep the income distribution of country j constant, and increase the
per capita income of country i while keeping its Gini coefficient constant,
this will imply an increase in bi and hence an increase in the price ratio for
all values of z0. If we keep the income distribution of country j constant, and
increase the Gini coefficient of country i while keeping its per capita income
coefficient constant, this will imply a decrease in bi and an increase in di.
The increase in di will imply a higher convexity of the price ratio function.
When there are changes in both per capita income and the Gini coefficient,
the direction of the change in b will depend on the values of the parameters
while the positive relationship between d and the Gini coefficient still hold.
The above results can be formalized as follows:
Proposition 2 If the price ratio of the same good between two countries i and j
pi(z0)
pj(z0)
is a function of the quality of that good z0, then the difference in income in-
equality between the two countries determines the power of the price ratio function.
Specifically, if the Gini coefficient of country i is higher (lower) than that of country
j, then the price ratio function is upward (downward) sloping.
We now explore the implications of Proposition 1 and 2 for the B-S rela-
tionship, in two alternative settings:
(a) Perfect quality measurement.
(b) A setting where quality is not measured as in Pakes (2003).
The B-S relationship is a relationship between a country’s level of income
and its national price level of final goods. As consumption bundles consist
of the x goods and the z goods in our model, to measure the national price
level, ideally we want to use observed data to reveal the unit price of the x
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goods and the price schedule of the z goods p(z). Then the price schedule
p(z) can be used to construct a price index of the z goods. Finally, the unit
price of the x goods and the price index of the z goods are aggregated into
a national price level. The above procedures of measurement and aggre-
gation face, however, a prominent practical issue. The issue is that quality
cannot be perfectly controlled for the z goods. Pakes (2003) shows how to
use hedonics to adjust quality biases in the price indexes of quality goods
due to the introduction of new goods. The adjustment procedures require a
complete dataset on the characteristics of the goods, which is impossible in
reality. Without the level of quality being observed, the observed prices of
the z goods cannot tell us anything about the price level of the z goods, as
their prices depend on both the level of quality z and the parameters b and
d in the price function. The measurement issue at the data collecting stage
will also contaminate the aggregation procedure. Without knowing the un-
derlying price schedule p(z), the common practice of constructing the price
index of the z goods is to use the simple average of the observed prices as its
price index. As a result, a higher price index of the z goods could be either
due to higher values of b and d in the price function or simply due to the
fact that the prices of higher quality goods have been observed.
Suppose quality can be properly measured, which means that we are
able to reveal the underlying price function p(z), then equation (2.9) im-
plies that there still exists the B-S relationship. To see this, suppose we keep
a country’s Gini index constant and increase its per capita income, this im-
plies a constant kc but a higher cm in the Pareto distribution. From (2.7) and
(2.9), d will stay constant as before but b will go up, resulting in an upward
shift of the price schedule p(z). Hence, for any quality goods, the price will
be higher than before. This is because a higher level of per capita income
will increase the demand for the higher quality goods. The resulting higher
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output will increase their prices as the marginal cost is increasing in output.
The elasticity of b with respect to cm is equal to kckc+ 1τ−1
. Given reasonable
values of the parameters, the elasticity is quantitatively small.
If quality cannot be adjusted as in Pakes (2003), we have to use the sim-
ple average of the observed prices of the z goods as its price index. Suppose
we again keep a country’s Gini index constant and increase its per capita
income, now the price index of the z goods not only reflects a higher b as
in the previous situation but also reflects the fact that now the country will
consume goods with higher qualities than before. This will cause an up-
ward bias in the price index of the z goods and hence in the national price
level. Moreover, as income inequality can affect the convexity of the price
function and the expenditure share on z goods as shown in Proposition 1
and 2, it will have an impact on the price index of the z goods and the na-
tional price level. The details are shown in the next section.
2.1.5 Aggregate Price Level
Given the market equilibrium price schedule p(z), we can calculate the av-
erage price level of z goods p, which is the total expenditure on z goods
divided by the total number of units.
p =
∫ ∞
zm
p(z)Qs(z)dz∫ ∞
zm
Qs(z)dz
=
∫ ∞
zm
bzdkzzkzm ( bAzτ )
1
τ−1 z−(kz+1)+(d−γ)(
1
τ−1 )dz∫ ∞
zm
kzzkzm ( bAzτ )
1
τ−1 z−(kz+1)+(d−γ)(
1
τ−1 )dz
= b
∫ ∞
zm
z−(kz+1)+(d−γ)(
1
τ−1 )+ddz∫ ∞
zm
z−(kz+1)+(d−γ)(
1
τ−1 )dz
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= b
z−(kz+1)+(d−γ)(
1
τ−1 )+d+1
−(kz+1)+(d−γ)( 1τ−1 )+d+1
|∞zm
z−(kz+1)+(d−γ)(
1
τ−1 )+1
−(kz+1)+(d−γ)( 1τ−1 )+1
|∞zm
If we assume −(kz + 1) + (d− γ)( 1τ−1) + d + 1 < 0, then
p =
−(kz + 1) + (d− γ)( 1τ−1) + 1
−(kz + 1) + (d− γ)( 1τ−1) + d + 1
bzmd
Since cm = αβzm p
′(zm) + p(zm) and p(z) = bzd, bzdm =
β
αd+βcm, we have
p =
−(kz + 1) + (d− γ)( 1τ−1) + 1
−(kz + 1) + (d− γ)( 1τ−1) + d + 1
β
αd + β
cm (2.10)
Substituting (2.7) into (2.10), we have
p =
kc
kc − 1cm
β
α
kz+γ( 1τ−1)
kc+ 1τ−1
+ β
Since the Gini coefficient and the mean of the Pareto income distribution
are equal to 12kc−1 and
kccm
kc−1 , we can express the average price level in terms
of the mean and the Gini coefficient
p = µ
β
α
kz+γ( 1τ−1)
1
Gini+1
2 +
1
τ−1
+ β
(2.11)
where µ = kckc−1 cm and Gini are the mean and the Gini coefficient of the
income distribution. This equation tells us the effects of per capita income
and income inequality on the average price level of z goods, which is sum-
marized in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 (Income Distribution and the Disaggregate Price Level) Per capita
income has a positive impact on the average price level of z goods, whereas income
inequality has a negative impact. Therefore, the elasticity of the average price of
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z goods with respect to per capita income is positive and its semi-elasticity with
respect to income inequality is negative.
Proo f : See Appendix 2.1.
Equation (2.11) also shows that the effect of per capita income on the
average price level of z goods depends on income inequality and the effect
of income inequality depends on per capita income.
Proposition 4 The effect of income inequality on the average price level of z goods
(the absolute value of ∂p∂Gini ) is increasing in per capita income µ, while the effect of
per capita income on the average price level of z goods ( ∂p∂µ ) is decreasing in income
inequality.
Proo f : See Appendix 2.2.
To investigate the implications of income distribution for the national
price level, we need to construct an aggregate price index.
Although the vertically differentiated goods are produced by local firms,
the homogeneous goods are tradable goods with their price level equal-
ized across countries. Therefore, the cross-countries price comparison is
still meaningful as we can compare the national price level using the price
level of the homogeneous goods as an anchor or a numeraire.
Here for simplicity and in order to derive analytical results, we define the
aggregate price level as the average price of x goods and z goods weighted
by expenditure shares as in the Laspeyres or Paasche index. In Proposition
5, the results regarding how income distribution affects the aggregate price
level are shown.
To make the results comparable with the empirical evidence, the results
regarding how income distribution affects the log of the aggregate price
level are also shown.
Proposition 5
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(a) Income Distribution and the Paasche Index: If we define the aggregate price
as the Paasche index
PP =
1
1
sharex +
p
p0
sharez = 1
αd
αd + β
+
p
p0
β
αd + β
,
where zero is used in the subscript to denote the variables from the base country,
i.e. the U.S., then per capita income has a positive impact on the aggregate price
level, or the elasticity of the aggregate price level with respect to per capita income
(ePP,µ ≡ ∂PP∂µ µPP ) is positive. Moreover, the impact of income inequality on the
aggregate price level and the semi-elasticity of the aggregate price level with respect
to income inequality (ePP,Gini ≡ ∂PP∂Gini 1PP ) depend on the per capita income relative
to the U.S.. They are both positive when per capita income is low enough relative to
the U.S. while they are both negative when per capita income is high.
(b) Income Distribution and the Laspeyres Index: If we define the aggregate
price as the Laspeyres index
PL =
1
1
sharex,0 +
p
p0
sharez,0 = 1
αd0
αd0 + β
+
p
p0
β
αd0 + β
.
Then per capita income has a positive impact on the aggregate price level, i.e. the
elasticity of the aggregate price level with respect to per capita income (ePL,µ ≡
∂PL
∂µ
µ
PL
) is positive, whereas income inequality has a negative impact, or the semi-
elasticity of the aggregate price level with respect to income inequality (ePL,Gini ≡
∂PL
∂Gini
1
PL
) is negative.
(c) No matter whether the aggregate price level is defined as the Laspeyres index
or the Paasche index, the effect of per capita income on the aggregate price level
(∂PP∂µ and
∂PL
∂µ ) is decreasing in income inequality and the effect of income inequality
( ∂PP∂Gini and
∂PL
∂Gini ) is decreasing in per capita income µ. Moreover, the elasticity of the
aggregate price level with respect to per capita income ePP,µ and ePL,µ is decreasing
in income inequality whereas the semi-elasticity of the aggregate price level with
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respect to income inequality ePP,Gini and ePL,Gini is decreasing in per capita income
µ.
Proo f : See Appendix 2.3.
In practice, the way to construct the multilateral price index as in the
International Comparison Program (ICP) is different. However, as shown in
Deaton and Heston (2010), it can be approximated very well by the bilateral
Fisher index, i.e., a geometric mean of the Laspeyres and the Paasche index.
Therefore, the results in Proposition 5 can be used to show how income
distribution affects the bilateral Fisher index or the national price level.
No matter whether the aggregate index is defined as the Laspeyres index
or the Paasche index, the elasticity of the national price level with respect
to per capita income is always positive and it is decreasing in income in-
equality. Since the elasticity of the Laspeyres index with respect to income
inequality is negative and the elasticity of the Paasche index with respect
to income inequality is decreasing in per capita income, with a low enough
per capita income, the elasticity of the bilateral Fisher index could be posi-
tive while it is negative with a high per capita income. This is confirmed in
Figure 2.3, where the derivatives of the bilateral Fisher index with respect to
income inequality ∂PF∂Gini for different combinations of per capita income and
income inequality are plotted. For a lower level of per capita income ∂PF∂Gini is
positive, while it is negative when per capita income is high.
The intuition behind the proposition is: with higher per capita income, a
country will spend a larger amount of its income on z goods, which implies
a higher average price of z goods due to the imperfect control over qual-
ity. Therefore, with a constant price of x goods, higher per capita income
implies a higher aggregate price level. However, with a higher Gini coeffi-
cient, a country will spend a smaller fraction of income on z goods. Since in
practice, the quality of z goods cannot be easily controlled, the lower expen-
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Figure 2.3: The Contour of the Effect of Income Inequality on the Bilateral
Fisher Index ( ∂PF∂Gini ) for Different Combinations of Per Capita Income and
Income Inequality.
Notes: The base country income distribution is calibrated using U.S. data in 2003.
diture share on z goods will imply a lower measured price level for z goods.
The Laspeyres index, which is the average price of x and z relative to the
U.S. weighted by the expenditure shares of the U.S., will be lower, since the
relative price of z is lower and there is no change in the relative price of x
and the weights. However, the impact on the Paasche index, which is the
average price of x and z relative to the U.S. weighted by the country’s expen-
diture shares, will depend on the country’s per capita income relative to the
United States. With a low enough per capita income, the price of x relative
to the U.S. will be higher than the price of z relative to the U.S.. So a lower
expenditure share on z goods will increase the measured aggregate price
level. With a higher per capita income, the relative price of z goods will be
comparable with or higher than the relative price of x goods, so the lower
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expenditure share on z goods will reduce the aggregate price level. Since
the product of the expenditure share and the average price of z enters the
aggregate price level, a higher per capita income, which increases the aver-
age price of z, will strengthen the effect of income inequality, while a lower
income inequality, which increases the expenditure share of z, strengthens
the effect of per capita income. Hence the effect of per capita income must
be decreasing in income inequality and the effect of income inequality must
be decreasing in per capita income.
Next, we ask: what is the key feature of the present model that leads
to Proposition 5. To address this question, we develop in Appendix 2.4 an
alternative model based on the classic model of vertical product differenti-
ation.
As quality is not controlled for in the price index of quality products,
the price index of quality products is measured as the average expenditure
on quality products. Keeping per capita income constant, the price index
of quality products will only depend on its expenditure share. Therefore,
whether income inequality can affect the price index of quality products
crucially depends on whether income inequality can affect the expenditure
shares.
In both the classic model of vertical product differentiation and the model
in Chapter 2, the expenditure share of the quality products crucially de-
pends on the convexity of the price schedule of quality products. In the
former model, for the sake of illustration, the price schedule is exogenously
given, so the expenditure share is constant and cannot be affected by in-
come inequality. This closes off the relation between the price level and
income inequality. In the latter model, the price schedule is endogenously
determined by the firm distribution and income distribution. As a result,
income inequality can affect the convexity of the price schedule and hence
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the expenditure share. Therefore, the price index of quality products will be
affected by income inequality. Since the national price level is a weighted
average of the price levels of the quality products and commodity goods,
the national price level will also be affected by income inequality.
2.2 Empirical Tests I: Income Distribution and the Aggregate Price
Level
This model predicts the B-S relationship, but it also predicts a new rela-
tionship between income inequality and the national price level, which is
summarized in Proposition 5 above. The new relationship is as follows:
Controlling for per capita income, income inequality is correlated with
the national price level: within countries with lower per capita income, in-
come inequality is positively correlated with the national price level, while
within countries with higher per capita income, the correlation is negative.
In this section, we investigate this prediction directly. In the next section,
we investigate some additional predictions of the model that follow from
Proposition 1 and 3.
To show that not only per capita income but also income inequality is
important in determining the aggregate price level, we extend the regres-
sion in Rogoff (1996) by adding the Gini coefficient as an extra regressor to
investigate if the Gini coefficient helps to explain national price differentials.
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Figure 2.4: Price Level versus GDP per capita in 2003 (U.S.=1)
Notes: Source: The Penn World Table 6.2
First, the figure in Rogoff (1996) is reproduced in Figure 2.4 using 2003
data.3 The data on prices and income are from Penn World Table PWT 6.2.
The data on the Gini coefficients are taken from the World Bank: World
Development Indicators 2007. Figure 2.4 shows that the problem with the
Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis still persists; it performs well for the whole
sample, but does not perform well either within poor countries or within
rich countries.
3Data from 2003 is used because cross-sectional Gini coefficients from World Devel-
opment Indicators 2007 is computed not using the same year data for each country, but
with most of them observed around the year 2003. Since Gini coefficient is relatively stable
within a couple of years, Gini coefficients from WDI 2007 are taken as the Gini coefficients
of 2003 for each country. The year 2003 is also chosen as the sample year for other variables
in the regression.
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Table 2.1: The Effects of the Gini Coefficient in 2003
Relative Price Level log(Pj/PU.S.)
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Constant -0.204∗∗∗ -0.186 1.187∗∗∗ 1.462∗∗∗ 1.168∗∗∗
(0.077) (0.180) (0.323) (0.413) (0.323)
log(Yj/YU.S.) 0.413∗∗∗ 0.408∗∗∗ 1.180∗∗∗ 1.242∗∗∗ 1.160∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.040) (0.160) (0.170) (0.161)
Gini Index - -0.069 -3.766∗∗∗ -4.115∗∗∗ -3.678∗∗∗
(0.456) (0.857) (0.927) (0.858)
Gini Index × log(Yj/YU.S.) - - -1.969∗∗∗ -2.121∗∗∗ -1.921∗∗∗
(0.399) (0.427) (0.400)
VAT - - - -0.00899 -
(0.00842)
Population - - - - -3.03e-07
(2.56e-07)
Observations 130 124 124 118 124
R-squared 0.512 0.499 0.584 0.584 0.589
Note: Data on price and income are taken from the Penn World Tables 6.2. Data
on the Gini Index are taken from World Bank: World Development Indicators 2007.
VAT data is from International VAT and IPT Service. Population data is from WRDS.
∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate statistically significant different from zero at 1%, 5% and 10%
level respectively.
The regressions with the Gini coefficients for the year 2003 are shown
in Table 2.1. Results from Regressions (1) to (5) are consistent with the fact
that countries with higher income tend to have higher price levels as the
estimated coefficients of relative income are all significantly positive. More-
over, the estimated coefficient of per capita income is 0.413 in Regression
(1), which is similar to Rogoff’s estimate using the 1990 data. However, the
Gini coefficient in Regression (2) is not significant, while when the prod-
uct of the Gini index and relative income is included as an interaction term
in Regression (3), both the Gini index and the interaction term become sig-
nificantly negative. This implies a negative relationship between income
inequality and the national price level if country j’s per capita income is
similar to that of the U.S., and this effect is decreasing in per capita income.
This also explains why the Gini index in Regression (2) is not significantly
negative. This is because Regression (2) fails to include the interaction term
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which has significant explanatory power, the estimated coefficient of the
Gini index will be the sum of the estimated coefficient of the Gini index in
Regression (3) and the product of the estimated coefficient of the interaction
term in Regression (3) and the relative income. Since in the sample, most
of the relative incomes in logarithm are negative, when they are multiplied
with the negative coefficient of the interaction terms, they reduce the mag-
nitude of the negative coefficient of the Gini index and make it insignificant
in Regression (2). Therefore, the results show that per capita income has a
positive impact on the aggregate price level, i.e. the Penn effect, while in-
come inequality also has a significant impact on the aggregate price level
and the impact is decreasing in per capita income. These are consistent with
the model predictions in Proposition 5 that per capita income has a posi-
tive impact on the national price level and the impact of income inequality
on the national price level is decreasing in per capita income. Regressions
(4) and (5) control for VAT and population, with the latter being a proxy
for market size. The estimation results show that the inclusion of these two
control variables does not change the estimation result in (3). Moreover,
both control variables are not significant at the 10% level.
Table 2.2: Different Behaviors of Income Distributions in Different Samples in 2003
Relative Price Level log(Pj/PU.S.)
Threshold=0.33 of YU.S Threshold=0.60 of YU.S
Poor Countries Rich Countries Poor Countries Rich Countries
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Constant -0.899∗∗∗ -1.376∗∗∗ 0.256∗∗∗ 0.999∗∗∗ -0.713∗∗∗ -0.978∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗ 1.066∗∗∗
(0.124) (0.223) (0.085) (0.224) (0.107) (0.204) (0.074) (0.168)
log(Yj/YU.S.) 0.157∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗ 0.915∗∗∗ 0.910∗∗∗ 0.223∗∗∗ 0.234∗∗∗ 0.361 0.378∗
(0.049) (0.048) (0.181) (0.145) (0.044) (0.046) (0.230) (0.205)
Gini Index - 1.113∗∗ - -2.125∗∗∗ - 0.684 - -2.721∗∗∗
(0.440) (0.632) (0.441) (0.477)
Observations 96 95 34 29 105 102 25 22
R-squared 0.097 0.154 0.444 0.642 0.196 0.211 0.097 0.660
Note: Data on price and income are taken from the Penn World Tables 6.2. Data on the Gini Index are taken
from World Bank: World Development Indicators 2007. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ indicate statistically significant different
from zero at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
Given the significance of the interaction term, to further understand how
income distribution affects the national price level in poor and rich coun-
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tries, in Table 2.2 the whole sample is split into two subsamples according
to the relative income level, and the above regressions are run for the two
subsamples. First, the threshold is set to 33% of the per capita GDP of the
U.S.. The Penn effect is confirmed in Regressions (1) to (4) as the estimated
coefficients are all significantly positive. However, within poor countries,
income inequality has a positive impact on the national price level; whereas
within rich countries, the impact is negative. This is consistent with the
negative coefficient of the interaction term in Table 2.1, i.e. the impact of
income inequality on the national price level is decreasing in per capita in-
come. Moreover, this is also consistent with the model prediction shown
in Figure 2.3 that within countries with lower per capita income, income
inequality has a positive impact on the national price level, while within
countries with higher per capita income, the impact is negative. When we
increase the threshold to 60%, Regressions (5) to (8) again confirm the Penn
effect. Given the higher threshold and the fact that the impact of income
inequality is decreasing in per capita income, within poor countries, the im-
pact of income inequality is positive but not significant while within rich
countries, the impact of income inequality becomes more negative. In terms
of R2, it can be seen that within poor countries, the inclusion of the Gini coef-
ficient increases the R2 marginally, while within rich countries the inclusion
of the Gini coefficient increases the R2 significantly. These results have con-
firmed that the relationship between per capita income and national price
level is far less impressive both within poor countries and within rich coun-
tries. Moreover, income inequality plays an important role in explaining
national price differentials, especially within rich countries. As for the quan-
titative impact of income distribution, the estimated coefficients in Regres-
sion (8) imply that aggregate price level increases by about 0.38 percentage
points with the 95% confidence interval being [−0.051, 0.807] in response
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to a one percentage point increase in per capita income, whereas the price
level decreases by about 2.72 percent with the 95% confidence interval being
[1.723, 3.719] in response to a one hundred basis points increase in the Gini
coefficient. Moreover, as the Gini coefficients are usually measured with
large errors, the magnitude of the estimate is probably biased downwards.
As have been shown in the model, the positive relationship between per
capita income and the national price level in Table 2.1 is due to the fact that
quality is not controlled for. For example, in Bils and Klenow (2001), they
use the U.S. data to show that quality growth of 66 durable goods causes an
over-estimation of inflation by 2.2%. If quality cannot be controlled for, then
it will show up in the price index. Moreover, due to the fact that income
elasticity of quality for many consumption goods are non-negligible and
tend to be higher for nontraded goods, which are priced in a non-linear
way, income distribution will matter for people’s choice of quality and will
affect the national price level through the price of nontraded goods. This is
why income inequality also affects the measured national price level.
2.3 Empirical Tests II: Income Distribution, Disaggregate Price lev-
els and Expenditure Shares
In this section, we examine the further predictions of the model that follow
from Proposition 1 and 3. For convenience, we repeat the statements of
these propositions as follows:
Proposition 1 (Income Distribution and Expenditure Share) Income inequality
has a positive impact on the expenditure share of x goods and a negative impact on
the expenditure share of z goods. Per capita income has no impact on expenditure
shares.
Proposition 3 (Income Distribution and the Disaggregate Price Level) Per capita
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income has a positive impact on the average price level of z goods, whereas income
inequality has a negative impact. Therefore, the elasticity of the average price of
z goods with respect to per capita income is positive and its semi-elasticity with
respect to income inequality is negative.
These propositions can be tested using a 2-step procedure, as follows:
Step 1: Using consumption expenditure data, we can identify which
good in the consumption bundle is more like the x goods and which good
is more like the z goods.
Step 2: To test if the empirical effects of income distribution on the price
level and expenditure share of the x and z goods are the same as predicted
in Proposition 1 and 3.
Since the aggregate price level is an average price level of consumption
weighted by expenditure shares, we have to understand the aggregation
methods used in practice in order to show that both the assumptions in the
model and the model mechanism are consistent with the data. In the con-
struction of both national price indices such as the CPI and multilateral price
indices in the Penn World Table, the first step is to construct the sub-indices
for different components of consumer expenditure. Then, expenditure data
from each country’s national account is used to construct the weights for dif-
ferent components and all the sub-indices are aggregated into an aggregate
price index using these weights. However, some aspects of this aggregation
method can have important consequences.
As it will be shown in Section 2.3.1, for consumption goods such as food
and housing, the income elasticity of quantity is close to zero, while for con-
sumption goods such as clothes, the income elasticity of quality is close to
zero. Based on whether income elasticity of quality is zero or income elas-
ticity of quantity is zero or both are nonzero, we can identify three types
of goods. We call the first type x goods and the second type z goods. This
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observation combined with the aggregation method can have two conse-
quences. Firstly, due to the lack of data on the characteristics of goods, the
aggregation method is not able to control quality, hence the higher quality
of z goods will be translated into a higher price. Secondly, as has already
been shown in the model, income inequality affects the price function and
the expenditure share of z goods, and hence the aggregate price level.
Guided by the dichotomy of x and z goods, to understand how income
distribution influences the aggregate price level, Section 2.3.2 investigates
how disaggregate prices and expenditure shares change with income dis-
tribution, which can be used to show that the mechanism of the model is
consistent with the data.
2.3.1 Identification of x goods and z goods
In the traditional literature, prices usually do not play a role and consump-
tion (physical quantity) is equivalent to consumption expenditure given
that the price function is linear and unit price is constant. Hence the income
elasticity for one good is the income elasticity of consumption (or consump-
tion expenditure) for that good.
However, in this chapter, because a type z good is priced in a non-linear
way, the equivalence between consumption and consumption expenditure
is broken.
In general, since expenditure is the product of quantity and unit price,
which depends on the quality of the good, income elasticity of expenditure
can be decomposed into income elasticity of quantity and income elasticity
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of quality (unit price) as follows:
eexpenditure =
dlog(consumption expenditure)
dlog(income)
=
dlog(quantity× unit price)
dlog(income)
=
d[log(quantity) + log(unit price)]
dlog(income)
=
dlog(quantity)
dlog(income)
+
dlog(unit price)
dlog(income)
= equantity + equality
Moreover, consumption goods differ in their income elasticities of quan-
tity and quality. Here we try to divide all the consumption goods into two
groups according to their relative magnitudes of these two elasticities. The
first type of goods which we call x goods has very low income elasticity of
quality but high income elasticity of quantity. Given this fact, it is assumed
that consumers can only change the quantity of x goods but not the quality.
The other type of goods which we call z goods has very high income elastic-
ity of quality but low income elasticity of quantity. Similarly, it is assumed
that consumers can only change the quality of z goods but not the quantity.
In this subsection, expenditure and quantity data from the U.S. are used
to identify which category a particular consumption good belongs to. This
subsection focuses on four categories of consumption goods, namely food,
housing, clothes and vehicles. It is shown that the income elasticities of
quantity of food and housing are close to zero and the income elasticity
of quality of clothes is close to zero, while both elasticities are nonzero for
vehicles. Table 2.3 also shows that these four categories plus hotels and
restaurants account for on average more than 60% of the total expenditure
within OECD countries, and the expenditure on z goods constitute on av-
erage around 70% of the total expenditure of these five categories, hence it
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is important to incorporate the dichotomy of x goods and z goods into the
model due to its significant expenditure share.4
Table 2.3: Expenditure Shares of Food, Housing, Apparel, Transportation and
Restaurants and Hotels
Country Share of Share of Share of z goods
the Five Categories z goods within the Five Categories
Max 0.751 0.508 0.805
Min 0.466 0.314 0.632
Average 0.606 0.426 0.703
Standard Deviation 0.051 0.043 0.042
Food
As has been documented in the literature, calorie intake does not vary with
permanent income across households. Specifically, Aguiar and Hurst (2005)
find that employed household heads with a higher income consume simi-
lar amounts of calories as employed household heads with a lower income.
However, conditional on log calories, they find that the income elasticities
of vitamin A and vitamin C are over 0.30 and the income elasticities of vi-
tamin E and calcium are 0.17 and 0.08, respectively. In addition, the income
elasticity of cholesterol is negative.
The results suggest that the income elasticity of quantity for food is very
close to zero. Households with higher income do not consume a larger
quantity of food than households with lower income. Instead, they con-
sume higher quality foods, such as those rich in vitamin and calcium. On
the other hand, low income households consume cheaper calories by having
a higher composition of fat and cholesterol in their diets.
4Since food at restaurant is a substitute of food at home and staying at a hotel is a
substitute of staying at home, given the z goods feature of food and housing, hotels and
restaurants should be z goods as well.
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Housing
As has been defined previously, the number of houses counts as quantity
whereas other characteristics of a house, such as square meters, all count
as quality. Micro-evidence has shown that the price function of housing is
nonlinear. For example, Anderson (1985) estimates the hedonic price func-
tion of housing, i.e. regressing the housing price on characteristics of the
house which include structural characteristics of the house, improvements
to the house, physical characteristics of the lot, neighbourhood character-
istics, etc. He shows that the price function is convex. Even if we define
housing by square meters, the price function is still estimated as a convex
function. For example, Coulson (1992) estimates a nonparametric response
of housing price to floorspace size. The marginal price is estimated to be in-
creasing, which implies a convex price function. Mason and Quigley (1996)
estimate the hedonic price indices for downtown Los Angeles and they find
the price function is convex in size (1000 sq ft). Also, Bao and Wan (2004)
find that the sale price per square foot is increasing in gross area controlling
for other characteristics using Hong Kong data.
We use data from the SCF (Survey of Consumer Finances) to compute
the number of residences, total value of residences and value per residence
by percentile of income. Figure 2.5 plots the results for the year 2004.
By inspection, one can see that as we move from the low percentile of
income to the high percentile of income, the number of residences only
changes modestly and almost all the variation in total value of residence is
due to the variation in value per residence. This implies a very low income
elasticity of quantity.
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(a) Number of Residences
(b) Total Value of Residences (thousands of dollars)
(c) Value Per Residence (thousands of dollars)
Figure 2.5: Housing Quantity and Quality by Percentile of Income (SCF
2004)
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Clothes
The detailed expenditure data on clothes are extracted from the raw data
files of the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX), which includes both the
expenditure on and quantity of clothes. The total expenditure on a certain
type of clothes is divided by the number of clothes to get the unit price.
Figure 2.6 plots the total expenditure and the unit price for different types
of clothes across the nine income classes in the CEX. The white bars denote
the total expenditure and the black bars denote the unit price. It can be seen
that for all types of clothes, unit prices are almost the same for all income
classes, which suggests a very low income elasticity of quality.
Vehicle
Data on the quantity and expenditure of vehicles is also available from the
CEX. As has been done for housing, Figure 2.7 plots the number of vehicles,
total value of vehicle purchases and unit value per vehicle across income
classes. It shows that neither income elasticity of quantity nor income elas-
ticity of quality is zero. As we move from lower income groups to higher
income groups, both quantity and quality increase significantly.
In addition to the four consumption goods noted above, Bils and Klenow
(2001) also document the relative importance of income elasticity of quality
and quantity for 66 durable goods in the CEX. Although they assume that
the hedonic price function is linear, their results are consistent with some of
the above evidence. For example, the income elasticity of quality of clothes
is very low and the income elasticities of quantity and quality of vehicles
are of the same magnitude.
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(a) Coats (b) Sweaters
(c) Pants (d) Shirts
(e) Undergarments (f) Hosiery
(g) Footwear
Figure 2.6: Total Expenditure and Unit Price for Different Types of Clothes
in Dollars (CEX 2003).
Notes: White bars denote total expenditure and dark bars denote unit price.
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(a) Number of Vehicles
(b) Total Value of Vehicles (dollars)
(c) Value Per Vehicle (dollars)
Figure 2.7: Vehicle Quantity and Quality by Percentile of Income (CEX 2007)
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In summary, the evidence presented shows that the income elasticities of
quantity of food and housing are close to zero, the income elasticity of qual-
ity of clothes is close to zero and both are nonzero for vehicles. Some may
argue that the observed two elasticities are equilibrium outcomes, which are
endogenous. Hence, the observed patterns cannot be taken as primitives in
the model. However, the observed elasticities, especially the zero income
elasticity of quantity of food and housing, are not due to equilibrium out-
comes, but instead, are due to the nature of the goods. For example, the
daily calorie intake has to be within a certain range regardless of income and
for convenience, a household usually has one primary residence. Finally,
given the fact that the tradability of food and housing is generally lower
than that of clothes and vehicles, it is reasonable to assume that x goods are
tradable with the price normalized to 1 and z goods are non-tradable with a
non-linear price function.
2.3.2 The Impact of Income Distribution on the Price Levels of In-
dividual Product Groups and Expenditure Shares
Since the national price level is an average price level of disaggregate price
levels weighted by expenditure shares. By examining how disaggregate
price levels and expenditure shares vary with income distribution, we can
trace out the main drivers of the positive relationship between per capita
income and the national price level, and, more importantly, the relationship
between income inequality and the national price level.
In this subsection, we investigate empirically how income distribution
affects disaggregate price levels and expenditure shares. This leads to direct
tests of the model’s predictions in Proposition 1 and 3.
In the model, whether one good belongs to x or z will crucially deter-
mine how income distribution affects its price level and expenditure share.
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However, in practice, few goods are pure x or pure z. Nevertheless, we
can quantify the degree to which a good belongs to x or z based on the fea-
tures of these two types of goods. The prices of the x goods are assumed to
be equalized across countries and the prices of the z goods are locally de-
termined and related to local per capita income. We can therefore use the
elasticity of a product’s price with respect to per capita income, which is
designated here as the quality index of the product, to measure whether the
product is more like a x good or a z good.
As the most disaggregate level of the PPP data from the ICP is the basic
heading level, we first compute the quality index for each basic heading by
running cross-country regressions, by regressing the log of the price levels
of one product on the log of countries’ per capita income.
Then we regress the disaggregate price level on per capita income, the
Gin coefficient and the product of per capita income and the Gini coefficient
for each basic heading using the underlying PPP data from the ICP5 and
show how the estimation results vary from the basic headings with high
quality index to the basic headings with low quality index.
log(Pricei) = β0 + β1 log(Per Capita Income) + β2 Gini
+β3log(Per Capita Income) · Gini + ei
To do so, we plot the estimated coefficient from the above regression
against the quality index to see how the latter affects the coefficient of per
capita income, the Gini coefficient and the interaction term. Panel (a), (b)
5The dataset used here is from the ICP benchmark 2005, which provides disaggregate
price indices and expenditure data at the basic heading level. They are the underlying data
behind the national price level in the Penn World Table. The basic headings which are
classified as government consumption or investment are excluded from this study since
the consumption of these categories is due to other reasons that are not supposed to be
captured by this chapter.
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and (c) in Figure 2.8 plot these estimated coefficients, i.e. βˆ1, βˆ2 and βˆ3,
against the quality index.
(a) βˆ1 vs Quality index (b) βˆ2 vs Quality index
(c) βˆ3 vs Quality index (d) Corr(Expenditure Share, Gini) vs Quality
Index
Figure 2.8: How the Quality Index Affects the Impact of Income Distribu-
tion on the Price Level of Individual Product Groups and Expenditure Share
(Source: ICP 2005)
Notes: The size of markers in the above scatter plots is proportional to the average expen-
diture share of each basic heading over all the countries in the ICP program.
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Thus, the empirical evidence at the disaggregate level is consistent with
the model’s mechanisms, through which income distribution affects the na-
tional price level.
Chapter 3
An Examination of Product Level Data
3.1 Introduction
Chapter 2 is devoted to exploring the Balassa-Samuelson relationship at the
aggregate level. To further understand the sources of the aggregate relation-
ship at the disaggregate level, in this chapter, we take a purely statistical
approach in asking the question: what is the best statistical description of
the relationship between wealth and the price levels of individual products.
The motivation of doing so is that the huge variations in the aggregate
B-S relationship across countries with different levels of income imply that
using the B-S hypothesis as the single general theory to explain national
price levels is far from satisfactory. The driving forces of the huge variations
are crucial to understand the aggregate price level. For example, Rogoff
(1996) has shown that there is empirical support for it when comparisons
are made between the set of poor countries and the set of rich countries.
However, its explanatory powers are far less impressive within either the
poor countries group or the rich countries group. As shown in Chapter 2,
regressing the national price level on per capita GDP generates an R2 of
0.51 in the whole sample. When the whole sample is split according to per
capita income with 60 percent of the US GDP per capita as the threshold, the
R2s within the poor countries and the rich countries become 0.20 and 0.10
respectively. In addition to R2, the two countries groups also differ in the
elasticity of the national price level with respect to per capita income. Within
the poor countries, the elasticity of the national price level with respect to
60
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per capita income is around 0.22, which is far lower than the elasticity of 0.36
within the rich countries. The above two results are robust to the choice of
threshold. For example, using one third of the US GDP per capita as the
threshold can only affect the results quantitatively but not qualitatively.
Since the national price level is an average of disaggregate price levels
weighted by expenditure shares, we can use the underlying disaggregate
price levels and expenditure shares to dig out the sources of the variations in
the B-S relationship. Our goal in this chapter is to find the cleanest statistical
description of the relationship between wealth and the price levels of indi-
vidual products. However, testing the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis using
disaggregate price levels is not new in the literature. For example, Heston
et al. (1994) use disaggregate price levels to test an intermediate prediction
of the hypothesis: the price ratio of tradable to nontradable is decreasing in
income. Similar tests can be found in Kravis and Lipsey (1988). These tests
did provide empirical support for the hypothesis, but they did not address
the variations of the B-S effects across countries and products.
Our empirical strategy is, instead of assuming a stable relationship be-
tween the price levels of individual products and per capita income across
countries, to adopt a more agnostic approach by allowing for more flexi-
bility in the parametric relationship between the price level and per capita
income to accommodate the large variations in the relationship. This ap-
proach turns out to enable us to identify a clear and striking empirical pat-
tern: for some products, the B-S relationship is weak and disperse. While
for other products, the B-S relationship is highly nonlinear, which is best de-
scribed as a spline relationship: within low- and middle- income countries,
the relationship between per capita income and the price level is weakly
positive, while within high-income countries, there is a sudden increase in
the slope of the positive relationship.
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(a) (b)
Figure 3.1: Two Archetypes of Price-Wealth Relationships
We illustrate the two types of relationship in Figure 3.1.
The details about how to quantify the B-S relationship at product level
and their theoretical implications will be provided in the next section.
3.2 Empirical Evidence: Characterizing the B-S Relationship at Prod-
uct Level
The disaggregate price levels used in this chapter are from the ICP 2005
benchmark dataset, which includes all the price levels at the basic heading
level. Basic headings are defined as the most disaggregate price level, at
which there exists matching expenditure data from national accounts. These
price levels of basic heading are just the disaggregate price levels underlying
the national price level in the Penn World Table.
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To get an idea of how the B-S effect varies across products and countries,
we first plot the scatter diagram of the price level against GDP per capita
(in logarithm) relative to the US for each basic heading in Figure 3.2. On
inspection, we can identify a clear and striking empirical pattern: for some
products, the B-S relationship is weak and disperse. For example, in the
case of
While for other
products, the B-S relationship is highly nonlinear, which is best described
as a spline relationship: within low- and middle- income countries, the re-
lationship between per capita income and the price level is weakly positive,
while within high income countries, there is a sudden increase in the slope
of the positive relationship. For example, in the case of
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
(5) (6) (7) (8)
(9) (10) (11) (12)
(13) (14) (15) (16)
(17) (18) (19) (20)
(21) (22) (23) (24)
Figure 3.2: Disaggregate Price Level of Basic Headings and GDP Per capita
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(25) (26) (27) (28)
(29) (30) (31) (32)
(33) (34) (35) (36)
(37) (38) (39) (40)
(41) (42) (43) (44)
(45) (46) (47) (48)
Figure 3.2 Continued: Disaggregate Price Level of Basic Headings and GDP
Per capita
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(49) (50) (51) (52)
(53) (54) (55) (56)
(57) (58) (59) (60)
(61) (62) (63) (64)
(65) (66) (67) (68)
(69) (70) (71) (72)
Figure 3.2 Continued: Disaggregate Price Level of Basic Headings and GDP
Per capita
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Figure 3.2 Continued: Disaggregate Price Level of Basic Headings and GDP
Per capita
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Figure 3.2 Continued: Disaggregate Price Level of Basic Headings and GDP
Per capita
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Figure 3.2 Continued: Disaggregate Price Level of Basic Headings and GDP
Per capita
To facilitate the test of our later hypotheses, it is better to quantify the
observed patterns. However, it is not clear a priori how best to characterize
these relationships. We therefore adopt a number of different approaches.
Approach 1 – a quadratic fit: we first use a quadratic function, i.e. a
second-order polynomial to fit the data. The R-squared from the quadratic
estimation is then chosen as the summary statistic of the degree to which
each scatter plot is a ‘spline’ relationship. The disadvantage of this ap-
proach is that it leads to occasional spurious results. For example, as shown
in panel (a) of Figure 3.3, in the case of
Approach 2 – an unrestricted spline: we then try an unrestricted spline,
i.e. a piecewise linear function with two segments. The two segments are
defined by intercept and slope parameters. Maximum likelihood estima-
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tion is used to determine the four parameters for each basic heading. The
t-statistic of the slope coefficient of the second segment is used as the sum-
mary statistic for each scatter plot to indicate the degree of a ‘spline’ relation-
ship. However, this second approach cannot overcome the shortcomings of
Approach 1. For example, in panel (b) of Figure 3.3 the unrestricted spline
again yields a downward-sloping part that carries a large standard error,
and is probably spurious.
(a) Quadratic Fit (b) Unrestricted Spline Fit (c) Restricted Spline Fit
Figure 3.3: Comparison of the Three Approaches for the Case of
Approach 3 – a restricted spline: to avoid the arguably spurious results
in the previous two approaches, we modify the second approach by restrict-
ing the slope of the first segment to be zero. Now the spline is determined
by three parameters: the vertical position of the segment on the left, the
horizontal position of the intersection (break point) and the slope of the seg-
ment on the right. Maximum likelihood estimation is used to estimate the
three parameters. The t-statistic of the slope coefficient is used to measure
the degree of a ‘spline’ type relationship, as in the second approach.
We could also use other specifications to identify the spline relation-
ship. However, the three approaches all work in the sense that the summary
statistics do a good job in identifying the ‘spline’ relationship, which can be
summarized by one robust measure. In the panel (a) of Figure 3.4 we plot
the summary statistics from Approach 1 against those from Approach 3. In
panel (b), the summary statistics from Approach 2 are plotted against those
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from Approach 3. Both two plots show a positive relationship, which im-
plies that the results from all the three approaches are consistent. However,
as Approach 3 avoids the probably spurious result of a falling segment, we
use this as our preferred approach for the rest of the chapter.
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Figure 3.4: Comparison of Summary Statistics of Three Approaches
We now proceed to list all products ordered by our spline measure in
Table 3.1. All basic headings are classified into ND (non-durable), SD (semi-
durable), S (service), IS (individual service), CS (collective service) and IG
(investment goods) by nature of its output. The detailed methodology about
this classification can be found in Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (2006).
The ranking of the slope coefficient is shown in Table 3.1. This gives
the magnitude of the elasticity of the price level with respect to per capita
income, which is a candidate measure of the spline relationship. On inspec-
tion, one can see that there is no positive or negative relationship between
the two ranks. As the measures from the above three approaches are broadly
consistent, the slope coefficient does not emerge as a robust measure of the
spline relationship, and we prefer to use the t-statistic of the slope coeffi-
cient.
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Table 3.1: The Ranking of Basic Headings by the Degree of Spline Relation-
ship
Rank Basic Heading Name Classification Slope Rank
1 S 1
2 D 16
3 D 6
4 ND 18
5 S 14
6 IG 5
7 ND 57
8 SD 4
9 ND 49
10 ND 89
11 ND 48
12 ND 52
13 ND 51
14 ND 37
15 ND 47
16 ND 62
17 D 25
18 D 71
19 ND 90
20 ND 103
21 ND 87
22 IG 22
23 ND 79
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24 D 10
25 SD 12
26 ND 126
27 S 99
28 ND 15
29 S 97
30 ND 35
31 D 98
32 SD 45
33 D 7
34 ND 43
35 ND 58
36 S 123
37 ND 121
38 D 17
39 ND 110
40 ND 120
41 ND 44
42 D 8
43 ND 9
44 ND 73
45 ND 88
46 ND 46
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47 ND 122
48 ND 23
49 D 13
50 S 113
51 S 114
52 S 80
53 ND 63
54 S 101
55 S 27
56 ND 108
57 S 129
58 SD 86
59 S 84
60 S 112
61 IG 21
62 S 128
63 S 95
64 D 66
65 IG 42
66 S 111
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67 S 72
68 S 77
69 CS 38
70 IS 39
71 IS 40
72 ND 118
73 ND 65
74 S 107
75 ND 67
76 S 60
77 ND 119
78 S 85
79 S 116
80 ND 100
81 S 83
82 S 115
83 SD 53
84 S 117
85 SD 19
86 IG 78
87 S 109
88 ND 69
89 ND 96
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90 ND 30
91 SD 36
92 S 91
93 S 93
94 IG 64
95 SD 11
96 D 26
97 S 94
98 SD 29
99 SD 31
100 S 33
101 S 61
102 34
103 ND 50
104 S 102
105 ND 127
106 IS 76
107 CS 32
108 S 92
109 IS 68
110 ND 56
111 IS 74
112 IS 75
113 S 124
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114 IS 82
115 IS 81
116 S 28
117 ND 20
118 S 125
119 CS 105
120 CS 104
121 IS 54
122 S 41
123 SD 24
124 S 59
125 CS 106
126 S 55
127 IS 70
An examination of this list suggests a pattern: manufactured products
lie towards the top of the list, while pure services are at the bottom of the
list. For example, the basic headings of services, including S (service), IS (in-
dividual service) and CS (collective service), mostly appear in the latter half
of the table. Especially they dominate the bottom of it. Among the last 25
basic headings, there are only five that are not services. In other words, the
basic headings of services tend to display a ‘spline’ pattern in their B-S Price
Wealth relationships. This suggests looking for a further breakdown of all
basic headings by our spline measure and by nature of its output (services
or non-services) to examine the importance of this mechanism.
To do so, we first discretize the B-S price wealth relationship by choosing
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a threshold for the measure of the spline relationship, i.e. the t-statistic of
the slope coefficient: all the basic headings with a t-statistic less than 2.5
belong to type I, such as jam, while all those with a t-statistic greater than
or equal to 2.5 belong to type II. Then, depending on whether the output
is services or non-services, and on whether its price-wealth relationship is
Type I or Type II, we allocate all the basic headings into a 2× 2 table. This is
shown in Figure 3.5.
Non-Services Services
Type II
Type I
49
23
52
2
Figure 3.5: The Distribution of Basic Headings by Nature of Output (Ser-
vices or Non-Services) and Price-Wealth Relationship
Notes: The basic headings with a price-income relationship of type I are represented
by rectangles filled with north east lines. Those with a type II relationship are repre-
sented by those filled with dots. The nature of output of basic headings is indicated
by the background color: services are marked by a white colour while non-services are
marked by a gray one.
On inspection, we find few services basic headings displaying a Type
I pattern except for the two in the top right corner. The top left rectangle
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contains 23 non-services basic headings, the price levels of which do not
vary much with GDP per capita. This can be seen as empirical support
for the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) proposition: as most of non-services
products are tradable, international arbitrage of the tradable non-services
products can eliminate any price differentials across countries. However,
the PPP proposition only holds for a small fraction of all basic headings.
There are overall 101 basic headings in the bottom two rectangles with their
price wealth relationship displaying the spline shape, which cannot be ex-
plained by the traditional theories of the national price level. In particular,
49 of them are non-services. This is in sharp contrast to the PPP proposi-
tion. These empirical results suggest a theoretical strategy: it may be best
to proceed by looking for separate theoretical foundations for the (spline)
relationship for non-services and for the (spline) relationship for services.
We will pursue this approach in the next two chapters.
Chapter 4
Analysing S-group Products
4.1 Introduction
In Chapter 3, we have studied the Balassa-Samuelson Price Wealth relation-
ship, i.e. the relationship between the national price level and GDP per
capita, at the basic heading level. Plotting the price level against GDP per
capita1, we found that the relationships vary substantially across basic head-
ings. But we can identify two archetypes, denoted by type I and type II.
Type I displays a weak and disperse relationship between the price level and
GDP per capita. Type II exhibits a highly nonlinear pattern: within low- and
middle- income countries, the B-S Price Wealth relationship is weakly pos-
itive, while the slope of the positive relationship suddenly increases when
we move to high-income countries. The substantial variations in B-S Price
Wealth relationship across products and countries suggest that the tradi-
tional explanation of national price levels, the Balassa-Samuelson hypoth-
esis among others, is not able to provide satisfactory answers to national
price differentials at both aggregate and disaggregate levels. To seek other
explanations, we investigated how the various B-S Price Wealth relation-
ships are related to the characteristics of each basic heading. Our strategy
is to quantify the B-S Price Wealth relationship by measuring the degree of
belongingness (membership) of each basic heading to these two archetypes.
The steps to compute this measure are given as follow: we first adopted a re-
stricted spline function, which can nest the two archetypes, to fit the scatter
1The logarithm of GDP per capita
80
Analysing S-group Products 81
plots of the B-S Price Wealth relationship. More specifically, it is a piece-
wise linear function with two segments. The segment on the left hand side
is horizontal and the one on the right hand side is upward-sloping. The t-
statistics of the slope coefficient of the upward-sloping segment is then used
as the measure of a basic heading’s membership of type II.
As shown in Table 3.1, we rank basic headings by their type II member-
ships in an ascending order. All basic headings are classified into ND (non-
durable), SD (semi-durable), S (service), IS (individual service), CS (collec-
tive service) and IG (investment goods) by nature of its output. The detailed
methodology about this classification can be found in Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (2006). Going through the long ta-
ble suggests that special attentions are needed for services, as their basic
headings are not randomly distributed in the table. The basic headings of
services, including S (service), IS (individual service) and CS (collective ser-
vice), mostly appear in the latter half of the table. Especially they dominate
the bottom of it. For example, among the last 25 basic headings, there are
only five that are not services. In other words, the basic headings of services
tend to display a ‘spline’ pattern in their B-S Price Wealth relationships. This
implies that the ‘spline’ relationship may be caused by some unique features
of services and we need to further explore in this direction.
This suggests that it might be appropriate to think in terms of modelling
the ‘service’ group (designated the ‘S-group’) separately from the manufac-
tures group (designated the ‘M-group’).
Enlightened by the high likelihood of a ‘spline’ relationship among the
basic headings of the S-group products, in this chapter we focus on explain-
ing this phenomenon. As the B-S Price Wealth relationship of the S-group
basic heading is a result of its service nature and other idiosyncratic fac-
tors. Therefore, in order to identify the common statistical property of the
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B-S Price Wealth relationship of the S-group products and cancel out the id-
iosyncrasy of each basic heading, instead of working at the basic heading
level as in Chapter 3, we will work at a more aggregate level: the S-groups
and the M-group basic headings. We will construct two aggregate price in-
dexes for the two groups and study the B-S Price Wealth relationship at the
group level. By this method, not only can we easily extract the common
statistical properties of the two groups, we can also contrast their statistical
properties and infer the distinctive features of each group. As it will become
clear below, the above strategy greatly facilitates us in finding the empirical
facts and proposing hypotheses accordingly.
In this chapter, our focus will be the basic headings of the S-group. As
the nontradable basic headings consist of only the basic headings of services
and construction, we will be literally looking into the rectangle in the bot-
tom right corner in Figure 3.5, the largest one in the table, which contains
52 services basic headings displaying the ‘spline’ pattern in their B-S Price
Wealth relationships. However, there is a distinctive feature about services
that distinguishes them from other products with low tradability, which is
usually caused by the high transportation cost relative to the unit value:
labour is the major input for producing services and hence local wages play
a crucial role in determining its price level. This feature turns out to play an
important role in explaining the price level of the S-group products.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 provides the em-
pirical evidence about how the aggregate price levels of the S-group prod-
ucts and the M-group products change with GDP per capita and shows that
their B-S Price Wealth relationship are statistically different. Section 3 de-
velops a general model to investigate the theoretical possibilities of how the
service wage changes with the average wage or GDP per capita, as the ser-
vice wage is a crucial determinant of the price level of services. In addition,
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sectoral wage data are used to test the model’s predictions. Section 4 sum-
marizes the main findings of the chapter and concludes.
4.2 The Aggregate Price Levels of the S-group products and the M-
group products
To set the stage for the theoretical analysis in later sections, this section pro-
vides the empirical evidence on the B-S Price Wealth relationship of the S-
group products. As the data on the price level are available only at the
basic heading level and our focus is the common property of the B-S Price
Wealth relationship among the S-group basic headings, the different levels
of aggregation in the data and in our goal require us to first construct the
aggregate price index of the S-group products. We therefore divide all the
basic headings into two groups: the S-group and the M-group. Then two
aggregate price indexes are constructed for the two groups using the EKS
method, a standard aggregation methodology in the common practice of
international price comparisons. The two aggregate price indexes are used
to investigate the B-S Price Wealth relationship of the S-group products and
the M-group products. The advantage of studying the price levels at the
group level is that it can cancel out the effects of each basic heading’s id-
iosyncratic characteristics and make it easier for us to identify the common
statistical properties of each group. In addition, this method can also con-
trast the two aggregate price indexes and identify how the special features
of the S-group products distinguish its B-S Price Wealth relationship from
that of the M-group products.
Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2 are the scatter plots of the two price indexes
against the log of GDP per capita. As the B-S Price Wealth relationships
of service basic headings usually display the nonlinear ‘spline’ pattern in
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Chapter 3, it is no wonder that the aggregate price wealth relationship of
the S-group products also displays a similar nonlinear relationship: the re-
lationship is slightly positive within poor- and middle- income countries
while there is a sudden increase in the slope of the positive relationship
among rich countries. However, in Figure 4.2 the aggregate price wealth re-
lationship of the M-group products displays a different pattern: for a group
of very rich countries the relationship is significantly positive, while for
other countries, the log of a country’s GDP per capita has little predictive
power for its M-group price level. In other words, even for countries with
very similar levels of GDP per capita there are still huge variations in their
price levels of the M-group products. In terms of the magnitude of price
dispersion, the S-group products and the M-group products are quite simi-
lar.
Further regression analysis also shows that the B-S Price Wealth relation-
ships of the two groups are significantly different. The overall explanatory
power of GDP per capita for the price level of the S-group products is much
higher than for that of the M-group products. Regressing the price level of
the S-group products on the log of GDP per capita generates a R2 of 0.553,
while using the price level of the M-group products yields a R2 of 0.159.
This result is robust to alternative specifications. For example, regressing
the log of the price level of the S-group products on the log of GDP per
capita generates a R2 of 0.593, while the R2 is only 0.120 for the case of the
M-group products.
Therefore, we can see that contrasting the two aggregate B-S Price Wealth
relationships enables us to identify the common statistical property shared
by all the basic headings of the S-group products, which is not possible if we
study the relationships at the basic heading level. In addition, the different
patterns observed in the B-S Price Wealth relationships of services and non-
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services require us to provide different explanations for the two sectors. We
start with services in the next section.
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Figure 4.1: Price of S-group vs log(GDP per capita)
4.3 The Service Sector
To explain the common statistical property of the B-S Price Wealth relation-
ship shared by the basic headings of services, we have to begin with the
fundamental features of services. In the context of our research, we will
focus on two key ideas:
(a) Many services, and especially personal services, involve labour as
the dominant input, and local labour cost may account for almost all of to-
tal cost. Imported inputs such as raw materials, machines and equipment
play a relatively very small role in producing services. For example, the
price of ‘hairdressing services’ is determined almost wholly by the wage
level of hairdressers. In other words, these products correspond to a polar
case in which the price level rises in direct proportion to GDP per capita.
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Figure 4.2: Price of M-group products vs log(GDP per capita)
This is also true for the prices of non-market services, i.e. those services that
are not sold on markets and are predominantly provided by governments.
These include collective government consumption (such as police, defense,
fire-fighting and general administration), health and education. As market
prices are not available, statisticians working on international comparisons
have resorted to the use of inputs into the production of non-market services
as proxies for output. Since the input costs are mainly made up of the wage
costs of the employees involved in producing services, the wage rate in the
service sector plays a decisive role in determining its price level. If this is
true, then in Figure 4.1 we have in effect plotted the wage in the service sec-
tor against GDP per capita, which is closely linked with the average wage.
In fact, the conventional semi-log form of plot, in which we plot the abso-
lute price level against the log of GDP per capita, is not the natural choice of
specification. It is appropriate for these industries, to use logs either on both
axes, or on neither. Taking a semi-log specification introduces a distortion,
so that a plot corresponding to a ray through the origin becomes a convex
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curve on the semi-log diagram. In other words, the ‘spline’ relation might
be just be a spurious effect arising from the inappropriate specification. We
return to this point later.
(b) There is, however, a complicating factor that might in principle mod-
ify this ‘average wage versus GDP per capita’ interpretation in a fundamen-
tal way. In terms of the ‘hairdresser’ example, the question is whether hair-
dressers occupy the same position in a country’s occupational wage distri-
bution as we go from poor countries to rich countries. More generally, the
wage in the service sector may not be proportional to the overall average
wage in the economy, as wage rates vary across sectors. For example, the
employees in the manufacturing sector usually enjoy the highest wages as
their highly skilled labour can be further augmented by the advanced pro-
duction technology adopted in the sector. While in the agricultural sector,
the least skilled labour combined with the least technology entails the low-
est wage. The service sector is somewhere between the above two cases, so
its wage rate is generally higher than the agricultural wage but lower than
the manufacturing wage. In addition to the sectoral wage difference, the
employment shares of the above three sectors also depend on each coun-
try’s level of development. For example, Kuznets (1966) and Maddison
(1980) documented that the agricultural employment share tends to decline
and the manufacturing share and the service share tend to rise as a country
develops. Therefore, the way in which the service wage changes with the
average wage or GDP per capita is a matter of importance. Given the tight
link between the service wage and its price level, the relationship between
the service wage and the average wage may be reflected in the scatter plot
in Figure 4.1 and could lead to a ‘spline’ pattern. Therefore, we need to in-
corporate the two facts into a theoretical model to analyze their potential
effects on the B-S Price Wealth relationship.
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4.3.1 A Distributional Bias Hypothesis
Due to the different wages across sectors, the service wage is in general not
proportional to the average wage. To understand how the service wage
is related to the average wage, we incorporate the facts that wages vary
across sectors and sectoral employment shares depend on a country’s level
of development into a theoretical model. The features of the model are the
heterogeneity in individual’s ability and sectoral productivity and using the
manufacturing employment share as an exogenous proxy for the level of
development.
The economy consists of a continuum of agents indexed by its ability θ,
which is assumed to follow a uniform distribution between 0 and 1, i.e., its
pdf is given by f (θ) = 1, 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1. There are three sectors in the economy:
agriculture, manufacturing and service, which all adopt linear production
technologies. One unit of labour input with ability θ yields σθ, σ2θ and
σ3θ units of output in the agriculture, service and manufacturing sectors
respectively, where σ > 1. It is assumed that there is a perfect competition
in labour markets, so wages are equal to the marginal product of labour in
the three sectors.
In this chapter, we focus on only the efficient outcomes by assuming that
there is a perfect sorting in allocating individuals with different abilities to
the three sectors: a fraction µ of total population with the highest ability
will be working in the manufacturing sector; individuals at the lower end
of the ability distribution will take the employment in the agriculture sector
and the rest will go to the service sector. µ is assumed to be exogenous. In
addition, the number of services each individual needs to consume in a fixed
period of time, say one year, is assumed to be one. Moreover, we assume
each employee in the service sector can provide k services in a year. Hence,
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the employment share of the service sector is also exogenously determined,
which is equal to 1k . The ability window for the three sectors is shown in
Figure 4.3.
Figure 4.3: Locating the Three Sectors on the Ability Distribution
We can now compute the average wages in the three sectors. Firstly, the
typical wage in the agriculture sector is
WA = σθ, θ ∈ [0, 1− µ− 1k ]
Hence, given the uniform distribution of ability, the average wage is equal
to
W¯A =
1− µ− 1k
2
σ
Secondly, the wage in the service sector is
WS = σ2θ, θ ∈ [1− µ− 1k , 1− µ]
and hence the average wage in this sector is
W¯S =
1− µ− 1k + 1− µ
2
σ2
Similarly, we can obtain the typical wage and the average wage in the
manufacturing sector respectively:
WM = σ3θ, θ ∈ [1− µ, 1]
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W¯M =
1+ (1− µ)
2
σ3
Given the above wages in the three sectors, we can compute the average
wage in the whole economy, which is equal to the weighted-average of the
wages in the three sectors. The weights are given by employment shares.
W¯All = W¯A(1− µ− 1k ) + W¯S(
1
k
) + W¯Mµ
=
(1− µ− 1k )2
2
σ+
2− 2µ− 1k
2
1
k
σ2 +
2− µ
2
µσ3
After obtaining the wages, we can now plot the average wages and the
ratios of the sectoral wage to the overall average wage against the exoge-
nous parameter µ in Figure 4.4 and 4.5 respectively to study how these
wages or wage ratios change with level of development. We assume k = 2
and σ = 1.5 in the two figures.
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Figure 4.4: Average Wages
In Figure 4.4, as µ increases from 0 to 1k , more and more individuals with
lower abilities enter the manufacturing sector and dilute the average ability
in the sector. Therefore, the average wage in the sector is decreasing in µ.
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Figure 4.5: Wage Ratios
In addition, the increase in µ pushes the ability windows of the agriculture
sector and service sector to the lower end of the ability distribution. Hence,
the average wages in the two sectors are also decreasing in µ. Although all
the sectoral wages are decreasing in µ, given that the wages in the manu-
facturing sector is on average higher than those in the other two sectors, an
increase in µ, i.e. a higher employment share of manufacturing sector, can
offset the decreasing sectoral wages and increase the overall average wage
in the economy. Since the sectoral wages are downward sloping and the av-
erage wage is upward sloping in Figure 4.4, the ratios of the sectoral wage
to the average wage must be decreasing in µ, as shown in Figure 4.5. How-
ever, the slope of the service wage ratio curve depends on the value of σ, a
parameter controlling the productivity differences across the three sectors.
The higher the value of σ, the larger the discrepancies there will be in the
sectoral wages. As a result, the slope of the service wage ratio curve will be
more negative. On the contrary, given a very low value of σ, the slope of the
service wage ratio will become very flat.
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Therefore, as the model predicts, if we allow for different sectoral wages
and the dependence of sectoral employment shares on a country’s level of
development, the ratio of the service wage to the average wage will depend
on productivity difference between the three sectors. Given very small pro-
ductivity difference, the service wage will be nearly proportional to the av-
erage wage. We will test these predictions of the theoretical model in the
next subsection.
4.3.2 Sectoral Wages and Employment Shares: Empirical Evidence
To test the hypothesis proposed in Section 4.3.1, we use the 10-Sector Database
from the International Comparisons of Output and Productivity by Indus-
try (ICOP), which collects the data on the value added and employment of
10 sectors for about 30 countries in Asia, East and West Europe, and North
and South America. Although the database does not contain direct mea-
sures of sectoral wages, we divide the total value added of each sector by
its employment to get a proxy for the sectoral wage. The year 2003 is cho-
sen as our sample year as the data are only available for a small number of
countries after that year.
In order to find the wages in producing services, we need to identify
whether the output of the 10 sectors are services or non-services. However,
the classification of the 10 sectors is a classification of productive activity
but not a classification of goods and services. It is based on the Interna-
tional Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities (ISIC)
Rev. 2. In ISIC Rev.2, service sectors are defined as the following four sec-
tors among the 10: Wholesale and retail trade and restaurants and hotels;
Transport, storage and communication; Financial, insurance and real estate
and business services; Community, social and personal services. Although
these sectors are classified into the service sector, some of their outputs have
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characteristics of goods. For example, the product of the sector of Transport,
storage and communication may be classified either as goods or services de-
pending on the medium by which these output are supplied. For instance,
on the one hand transportation services provide services to the general pub-
lic, while on the other hand, the infrastructure of transportation is often con-
sidered as manufactured goods. The same rule also applied to the sector of
Financial, insurance, real estate and business services. As the outputs of
these two sectors are mixtures of goods and services, we will focus on the
two uncontroversial service sectors to test our hypothesis. One is Wholesale
and Retail Trade, Hotels and Restaurants. The other is Community, Social
and Personal Services.
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(a) Wholesale and Retail Trade, Hotels and
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Figure 4.6: Employment Shares of Service Sectors
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Figure 4.7: Ratios of Service Wage to GDP per capita
We first plot the employment shares of the two sector against the log of
GDP per capita in Figure 4.6. On inspection, we can find that there are no
relationship between the employment share and GDP per capita for the two
sectors. This is consistent with our assumption in the model that the service
employment share is exogenously given and does not vary with GDP per
capita. Figure 4.7 are the scatter plots of the sectoral wage relative to GDP
per capita against the log of GDP per capita for the two service sectors. This
can be considered as a direct test of the service wage ratio curve in Figure
4.5. Both the two scatter plots display a weakly positive relationship, which
suggests that the distributional bias predicted in the model, i.e. the service
wage does not change proportionally with the average wage, is not quan-
titatively important in the data. Therefore, the hypothesis that the service
wage is proportional to the average wage holds well in reality. If this is the
case, plotting the price level of services against the log of GDP per capita
in Figure 4.1 should display an exponential relationship. This is confirmed
in Figure 4.8, where the log of the price level of service is plotted against
the log of GDP per capita. The linear fit in the figure suggests the relation-
ship between the log of the price level and the log of GDP per capita is well
captured by a linear function. In other words, there is a constant elasticity
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of the price level of services with respect to GDP per capita. This suggests
that the previous figures aiming at showing the price wealth relationship
of services may be subject to misspecification errors. If the service wage is
indeed proportional to the average wage or GDP per capita, plotting the
price level of services against the log of GDP per capita will generate an ex-
ponential curve, which usually has a J-like shape. This could explain why
we found many nonlinear ‘spline’ shapes in Chapter 3 in the basic headings
of services. As shown in Figure 4.8, a logarithm specification generates a
very good fit, which suggests a constant elasticity of the price level with re-
spect to GDP per capita. As a result, the nonlinear ‘spline’ effect disappears
in Figure 4.8. In addition, the point estimate of the elasticity is 0.489 with
a standard error of 0.037. Therefore, the hypothesis that the price level of
services changes proportionally with GDP per capita should be rejected, al-
though the service wage changes proportionally with GDP per capita as the
wage data suggested. One candidate explanation for this could be that the
costs of other inputs in the service sector do not change much with GDP per
capita, such as the highly tradable raw materials.
Therefore, we now know that the ‘spline’ pattern observed in the B-S
Price Wealth relationship of services is primarily due to the specification
we adopted in the scatter plot of Figure 4.1. Given the large elasticity of
the price level of services with respect to GDP per capita as a result of the
tight link between the price level and wage, the scatter plot in the Figure
4.1 should have been fitted by an exponential curve instead of a restricted
spline function. This is confirmed in Figure 4.8 as a linear fitting can well
capture the relationship between the log of the price level of services and
the log of GDP per capita.
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Figure 4.8: Log of Price of S-group products vs log of GDP per capita
4.4 Conclusion
As the spline pattern observed in the B-S Price Wealth relationship in Chap-
ter 3 appears a lot of times in the basic headings of services, it suggests that
there is a need to study them as a group.
To explain the empirical pattern for S-group products, we have built a
theoretical model to analyze how the service wage changes with the aver-
age wage, which is closely linked with GDP per capita. We then use the
data on sectoral wages and employment shares in the 10-Sector Database of
ICOP to test the model. The empirical evidence suggests a constant elastic-
ity of the price level of the S-group products with respect to GDP per capita.
In other words, there is no significant bias arising from the position of “hair-
dressers” in the national wage distribution. It follows that the scatter plot
of the price level of the S-group products against the log of GDP per capita
should display an exponential form. This explains why we find a nonlinear
‘spline’ relationship in Figure 4.1. Moreover, this can be confirmed in Fig-
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ure 4.8: plotting the log of the price level against the log of GDP per capita
eliminates the nonlinearity.
However, the above explanation does not apply to M-group products.
Plotting the log of the price level of M-group products against the log of
GDP per capita does not eliminate the nonlinearity found in Figure 4.2. This
suggests a different explanation for the price level of the M-group products.
We return to this in the next chapter.
Chapter 5
Analysing M-group Products
5.1 Introduction
Given the argument of the preceding chapter, that the S-group products
demand a different type of model, it is natural to return to the analysis of
Chapter 2, based on the mismeasured quality model, and to re-estimate the
results, comparing the (already reported) results for the full set of indexes
with the results for a modified price index based on M-group products only.
The model in Chapter 2 assumes the consumption bundle is made up of
two types of goods, tradable homogeneous goods x and nontradable verti-
cally differentiated goods z. It is assumed that every country has local firms
to product the second type of z goods, whose prices are affected by the local
distribution of income. This establishes a distinction between the goods that
are priced internationally and the goods that are priced locally. The prices
of internationally priced goods tend to be equalized across countries, while
the prices of locally priced goods are affected by the local distribution of
income.
In general, nontradable goods are priced locally. Some tradable goods
are priced internationally and some are priced locally. In Chapter 2, we
sharpen the contrast between the locally priced nontradable goods and the
internationally priced tradable goods by abstracting from the locally priced
tradable goods.
In Chapter 5, we make a contrast between the locally priced and interna-
tionally priced tradable goods. It would be of interest to extend the model
98
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to incorporate all the three types of goods in a multi-country model, so that
the internationally priced tradable goods are produced by any country in
the world, the locally priced nontradable goods are produced by a group of
local firms, and the locally priced tradable goods are produced by a group
of international firms.
5.2 Some Preliminary Observations
To analyse the M-group products, the scatter plot for the B-S price wealth
relationship using an index based on M-group products only is shown in
Panel (a) of Figure 5.1, where the price level of the M-group products is
plotted against the log of GDP per capita. In Panel (b) of Figure 5.1, the log of
the price level of the M-group products is plotted against the log of GDP per
capita. Two properties are worth noting. The first property is nonlinearity.
As shown in Figure 5.1, plotting the log of the price level of non-services
against the log of GDP per capita in (b) cannot eliminate the nonlinearity in
(a). There are still obvious variations in the price wealth relationship across
countries: within low- and middle- income countries, the relationship is
weakly positive; while within rich countries, the slope of the relationship
is large and significant. The second property is dispersion. Regressing the
price level of the M-group products on the log of GDP per capita generates
an R2 of 0.159. This can be compared to the R2 for the S-group products,
shown in Figure 4.1, of 0.553. The low value of R2 is robust to alternative
specifications: instead of using the semi-log specification, regressing the log
of the price level of the M-group products on the log of GDP per capita
generates an R2 of 0.119, while we would get a much higher 0.594 in the
case of the S-group products.
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(b) Log of Price of M-group Products vs log
of GDP per capita
Figure 5.1: Balassa-Samuelson Price Wealth Relationship for M-group Prod-
ucts
5.3 Re-estimating the Relationship
To formally show if income inequality can help explain the price level of
M-group products, we replicate the regressing of the national price level on
income distribution in Table 2.1 of Chapter 2, but now we do so for the price
level of S-group products, M-group products and the national price level
for the year of 2005. The year 2005 is chosen as the sample year because the
disaggregate price levels used to construct the price indices of the S-group
products and the M-group products are from the ICP Benchmark Dataset
2005.
All the estimation results are shown in Table 5.1. In the first three regres-
sions, the relationships between the national price level and income distri-
bution are consistent with what we have found in Chapter 2. The slope
coefficient in Regression (1), i.e. the elasticity of the national price level with
respect to per capita income is significantly positive. The point estimate is
0.354, which is of the same magnitude as in Chapter 2. Including the Gini
index as an additional regressor in Regression (2) only changes the results
slightly. However, in Regression (3), when we include an interaction term,
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defined as the product of the Gini index and per capita income, both the Gini
index and the interaction term become significantly negative. As argued in
Chapter 2, this is due to the fact that the national price level depends both
on per capita income and income inequality, and on their product. The lack
of significance of the Gini index in Regression (2) is due to misspecification
errors. The preferred specification of Regression (3) raises R2 from 0.465 in
Regression (1) to 0.554.
In Regression (4)-(9), we run the same regressions as above but using
the disaggregate price levels of S-group products and M-group products.
This can help us identify the sources of the results in Regression (1)-(3). On
inspection, we can find that all the above qualitative results in Regression
(1)-(3) in terms of the significance of and the sign of estimated coefficients
and the improvement in R2 also hold for the case of S-group products and
M-group products. In Regression (4) and (7), per capita income has sig-
nificantly positive impact on both the two price levels. Including the Gini
index and the interaction term as additional regressors makes all estimated
coefficients in Regression (6) and Regression (9) significant. The additional
explanatory powers of the latter two regressors also increase R2.
However, the magnitude of the results varies substantially between S-
group products and M-group products. Firstly, the elasticity of the price
level of S-group products with respect to per capita income, i.e. the coeffi-
cients of log(Yj/YU.S.) in Regression (4)-(6), are much higher than those of
M-group products in Regression (7)- (9). For example, in Regression (4) the
estimated elasticity is 0.489, which is six times the estimate in Regression
(7). This is consistent with the fact that labour is the most important input
in producing services as well as the fact that the service wage is nearly pro-
portional to the average wage or GDP per capita. For M-group products,
labour input plays less important role, so its price level will be less sensitive
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to the average wage.
Secondly, the R2 in Regression (4) is 0.594. In Regression (6), adding the
Gini index and the interaction term only increases the R2 by 0.007. This
again shows the crucial role of GDP per capita in explaining the price level
of S-group products. The Gini index can only provide a slight increase in
explanatory power. However, a comparison of R2s between Regression (7)
and (9) shows a substantially different picture. In Regression (7), given the
small slope coefficient, the R2 is only 0.119, but including per capita income
and the Gini index increases R2 to 0.370 in Regression (9). This implies that,
compared with per capita income, income inequality matters much more
for the price level of M-group products than that of S-group products. In
other words, the non-service component of the national price level is more
sensitive to income inequality than the service component. As the M-group
basic headings are mostly tradable, the above results suggest that tradable
vertically differentiated goods are the more source through which income
inequality influences the national price level.
Thus the estimation results in Table 5.1 suggest that income inequality
is an important factor influencing the price level of M-group products. It
can explain a large fraction of the variation in its price level that cannot be
explained using per capita income only. The large improvement in R2 that
occurs when we introduce the income inequality variable can partially ex-
plain one property implied by Figure 5.1: the high level of dispersion in the
B-S Price Wealth relationship may reflect a failure to take income inequality
into account. To investigate this, we plot the residuals from Regression (7)
and (9) against the log of GDP per capita in Figure 5.2. We can see that the
nonlinearity implied by Figure 5.1 is obvious in the residual plot as shown
in Panel (a) of Figure 5.2. Including the Gini index and the interaction term
in Regression (9) can effectively eliminate the nonlinearity. As evident in
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Panel (b), there is little nonlinearity left. The improvement in R2 is evident
from inspection of the scatters: the variance of the residuals shrinks.
Hence, the inclusion of the income inequality variable helps to resolve
the puzzles in Figure 5.1. The interpretation of these empirical results is left
for the next section.
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(a) Residuals from Regression (7)
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(b) Residuals from Regression (9)
Figure 5.2: Model Selection for the Price Level of M-group products
5.4 Reconciliation of the New Results and Chapter 2
Now our problems hinge on explaining two discrepancies between the model
in Chapter 2 and empirical evidence in this chapter. On the one hand, in-
come inequality can provide only a small amount of additional explanatory
power for the price level of the S-group products on top of GDP per capita,
while the model in Chapter 2 predicts that the impact of income inequality
on the national price level should be mainly through its impact on the price
level of nontradable vertically differentiated goods. On the other hand, in-
come inequality is an important explanatory variable for the price level of
the M-group products despite that the M-group products comprise mostly
tradable goods, whose prices tend to be equalized across countries accord-
ing the PPP proposition. We will reconcile these discrepancies in turn.
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5.4.1 Income Distribution and the Price Level of the S-group Prod-
ucts
Firstly, the reconciliation of the discrepancy between the model and the em-
pirical evidence in terms of the ability of income inequality in explaining
the price level of the S-group products is related to the way the price level
of services is measured in practice. Services, according to whether the mar-
ket price is available, can be divided into market services and non-market
services. The non-market services are predominantly provided by govern-
ments, which include collective government consumption (such as police,
defence, fire-fighting and general government administration), health and
education. Due to the fact that the bulk of these output is not sold on mar-
kets. So market prices are not available. And without prices, these outputs
cannot be valued or compared satisfactorily. In the absence of measures of
prices and output for these sectors, statisticians working on international
comparisons - as well as national income accountants - have resorted to the
use of inputs into the production of non-market services as proxies for out-
put. Input costs are often available. The inputs include the sum of the wage
costs of the employee involved in producing the services; the intermediate
consumption of goods and services (materials used and rents, for exam-
ple) and the services rendered by capital during the production process. As
labour is the major input in producing non-market services, wage plays an
essential role in determining the total cost or the price level reported by
the International Comparison Program. Moreover, given the service wage
changes proportionally with the average wage and the large share of non-
market services in total services, GDP per capita should be a fairly good
predictor for the input cost (or the price level) of services. The model in
Chapter 2, however, examines the relationship between income distribution
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and the price level, but not the input costs, of nontradable vertically differ-
entiated goods and predicts that income inequality should affect the price
level of services. As the price level of services is largely unobservable, due
to non-market services, the empirical result regarding the impact of income
inequality on the price level of services in this chapter is not a direct test of
the model in Chapter 2. It only tests how income inequality affects the input
cost instead of the price level.
5.4.2 Income Distribution and the Price Level of the M-group Prod-
ucts
Secondly, to explain why income inequality has significant impacts on the
price level of the M-group products, we will show below that the model’s
mechanism for nontradable vertically differentiated goods to be affected by
income inequality in the model can also be applied to tradable vertically
differentiated goods. Although these goods are tradable in the traditional
sense, i.e. transportation cost is low compared with unit values, we cannot
simply apply the PPP proposition and claim that their price levels must be
equalized across countries. This is because once tradable goods are verti-
cally differentiated, the way tradable goods are priced and the way their
price level is compiled will be changed.
Once tradable goods become vertically differentiated or they can be pro-
duced at different levels of quality, a natural outcome will be each country’s
comparative advantage in producing a product with a certain level of qual-
ity: rich countries may be more dominant in the market of high quality
products due to their advanced technology, while lower income countries
may have a large market share in the low-end markets because of their cost
advantage. The theoretical foundation and empirical supports was intro-
duced in Sutton and Trefler (2011). The above specialization implies that
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these tradable vertically differentiated goods will be supplied by a group of
producers, each of which is specialized to produce a product with a partic-
ular quality. Thanks to their comparative advantages, these producers can
price discriminate against each country’s market to the extent that the inter-
national price differential can make international arbitrage profitable even
after paying trade costs. Hence, to demonstrate how these producers price
the tradable vertically differentiated goods according to each country’s de-
mand condition, we need to introduce quality to a model of ‘Pricing to Mar-
ket’, which was introduced by Krugman (1987) to describe the practice of
price discrimination across countries when international arbitrage is diffi-
cult or impossible. Our method is, therefore, to apply hedonic price model
to an international context. This is very similar to the model in Chapter 2,
but now we only need to replace nontradable vertically differentiated goods
in the model by tradable vertically differentiated goods. As has been ex-
plained above, once tradable goods are differentiated by quality, their price
levels are not determined internationally but will be linked with the local
income distribution.
After the price function is determined, how their prices are compiled
into a price index is also an important issue. Quality as a complicating factor
for the B-S Price Wealth relationship has been studied in the literature. As
quality cannot be perfectly controlled in compiling price indexes, the price
index is just a simple average of individual prices without eliminating the
impact of quality. Therefore, a higher quality will show up as a higher price
level. For example, Schott (2004) showed that even within a Harmonized
System (HS) - 10 category, quality is still an important explanatory variable
for the U.S. important price. Empirical supports for the role of quality in the
B-S Price Wealth relationship appeared in Goldberg and Verboven (2001),
Hummels and Skiba (2004), Hallak (2006), Choi et al. (2009) and Imbs et al.
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(2010).
Given the above implications of vertical product differentiation, the next
question is what mechanisms in the model cause the ‘spline’ pattern ob-
served in the B-S Price Wealth relationship of the M-group products. As
shown in Figure 5.1, using a linear fitted line, i.e. assuming a constant elas-
ticity of price level with respect to GDP per capita, significantly underpre-
dicts the price level of the M-group products for rich countries.
We can illustrate this by applying the model in Chapter 2 to the M-group
products. Instead of assuming the consumption bundle is made up of both
nontradable and tradable goods, it is now assumed that the consumption
bundle includes only the M-group products, which consists of two types
of goods: homogeneous goods and vertically differentiated goods, both of
which are tradable. It is assumed that the consumption decision of each in-
dividual is to choose the quantity of the homogeneous goods and the quality
of the vertically differentiated goods.
As the quality is constant for the homogeneous goods, there is no quality
bias in its price index. However, the quality control problem in constructing
the price level of vertically differentiated good is a practical issue that has
yet been solved satisfactorily. As a result, quality can hardly be controlled
in the price index and higher quality products imply higher prices. In addi-
tion, as implied by the standard hedonic price model in the literature such as
in Rosen (1974) and Berry et al. (1995), the distribution of quality depends
on the distribution of consumers’ attributes, such as income distribution.
Therefore, it means that in addition to per capita income, income inequality
will matter for the aggregate price level of vertically differentiated goods
by affecting its quality distribution. Similar to the model in Chapter 2, the
new model will predict that a higher income inequality will imply a more
convex price function of the vertically differentiated goods. Given a high
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enough elasticity of substitution between the homogeneous goods and the
differentiated goods, consumers will respond to the change in income in-
equality by lowering the expenditure share on differentiated goods. As its
quality cannot be controlled, the lower expenditure will be translating to a
lower price level. With a constant price level of the homogeneous goods,
the aggregate price level of the M-group products will be lower. There-
fore, the low goodness-of-fit in Figure 5.1 is actually due to the failure in
taking into account the impact of income inequality. As income inequality
is usually lower in rich countries than the rest of the world and the coef-
ficient of the Gini index is estimated to be negative in Regression (6), the
misspecification of only using GDP per capita in fitting the price level of the
M-group products will cause the underprediction for rich countries in Fig-
ure 5.1. Moreover, the aggregate price level of the M-group products is an
weighted average of the price levels of homogeneous goods and vertically
differentiated goods, so the product of the expenditure share and the price
level of differentiated goods is a crucial component in the formula of the
aggregate price level. The higher per capita income in rich countries, which
implies a higher price level of differentiated goods, can interact with income
inequality and magnify the negative impact of income inequality on the ag-
gregate price level. This can be empirically supported by the significantly
negative coefficient of the interaction term in Regression (6) of Table 5.1. In
other words, the underprediction caused by failing to use income inequal-
ity is especially severe in rich countries. Hence, if we take into account the
impact of income inequality, we can explain the spline pattern in Figure 5.1.
This can be confirmed by Figure 5.2, where we plot the residuals from
Regression (4) and (6) against the log of GDP per capita. In panel (a), we
can see that the linear model is not able to capture the nonlinearity between
the log of the price level and the log of GDP per capita, as there is some het-
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eroskedasticity showing up in the residuals. However, as shown in Panel
(b) Regression (6) does a good job in eliminating the heteroskedasticity. This
implies that the model implied by Regression (6) is a better model for the
price level of the M-group products. The spline pattern we have found in
Figure 5.1 is actually an outcome of missing an important explanatory vari-
able.
5.5 Conclusion
Plotting the log of the price level of the M-group products against the log of
GDP per capita is not able to eliminate the nonlinearity in the semi-log scat-
ter plot. In addition, the B-S Price Wealth relationship is also disperse. These
two puzzling properties suggest a different explanation other than the one
for the case of the S-group products. We try to explain these puzzles by
focusing on one type of deviations from the PPP due to the vertical prod-
uct differentiation of tradable goods. The vertical product differentiation
combined with comparative advantages in producing these goods implies
that these goods will be supplied by a group of producers, each of which
is specialized to produce a particular quality product. Due to their com-
parative advantage, they will adopt the ‘Pricing to Market’ practice to price
discriminate against each country. To analyze how income distribution af-
fects the price level through quality, we study the hedonic pricing model in
an international context. We therefore revisit the model in Chapter 2, but
only apply it for the price level of the M-group products. We find that the
nonlinear pattern found in Figure 5.1 is mainly due to the fact that we fail
to take into account the impact of income inequality. As empirically the in-
come inequality has a negative impact on the aggregate price level of the
M-group products, this means that the linear fitted line will underpredict
the price level for rich countries, whose Gini indexes are in general lower
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than the rest of the world. This is why in Figure 5.1 a linear fit fails and the
scatter plot displays a nonlinear ‘spline’ pattern.
Chapter 6
Macroeconomics Implications
6.1 Introduction
In Chapter 2, we have used empirical evidence and a theoretical model to
show that if product quality cannot be perfectly controlled in the price level,
income distribution, i.e. both per capita income and income inequality, mat-
ters for the national price level. However, in addition to international price
comparisons, the quality control issue also applies to the price index within
one country. Pakes (2003) shows how to use hedonics to ameliorate qual-
ity bias in price indexes if we can collect the complete dataset on products’
characteristics, which is impossible in reality. Therefore, in practice hedonic
quality adjustment is not widely adopted for the price indexes. For example,
there is a very limited set of CPI items that utilize hedonic quality adjust-
ment, which includes only clothes, major appliances, television and other
video equipment. Hence, the mechanism of how income distribution af-
fects the national price level is likely to be relevant within each country, i.e.
the evolution of income distribution may influence the change of domestic
price index or inflation.
In this chapter we first extend the static model to a dynamic one and
solve the market equilibrium. Using the market equilibrium, we can obtain
the theoretical prediction about how growth, income inequality and infla-
tion co-evolve over time. Then we investigate the empirical implications of
the dynamic model. First, we use China as an example to compare the actual
price index and the price index corrected for the B-S effect in order to show
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how the quality issue affects the price index within one country. Second,
in an appendix of this chapter, we compare the predictions by the dynamic
model, i.e. how income distribution and inflation co-evolve over time, with
the empirical evidence from the US, the UK, Australia and Sweden.
6.2 The Dynamic Model
This section extends the static model in Chapter 2 to a dynamic one. Recall
that the model in Chapter 2 is a hedonic pricing model, in which consumers
and firms choose their optimal positions along an equilibrium price p(z),
where z is the characteristics of the product in question and p(z) is deter-
mined by the interaction between suppliers and consumers of that product.
On the demand side, there is a unit mass of consumers indexed by indi-
vidual income level c. The income distribution is assumed to be exogenous
and follow a Pareto distribution. We also assume the consumer purchases
exactly one unit of the quality good z and spends the rest of his/her income
on a homogeneous good x.
On the supply side, there is a unit mass of firms producing vertically
differentiated goods. The distribution of the firms is also assumed to be
exogenous and follow the Pareto distribution.
To solve the market equilibrium, we first convert the income distribution
to the distribution of quality demanded using the first order conditions of
the consumer’s problem. We then convert the firm distribution to the distri-
bution of quality supplied using the first order conditions of the producer’s
problem. Finally, we use the market clearing conditions for the quality prod-
uct to solve for the equilibrium price schedule p(z).
In the dynamic model, however, the income distribution is not exoge-
nously given anymore. The evolution of the income distribution depends
on the initial income distribution and the evolution of each individual’s op-
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timal choice. On the other hand, although the initial firm distribution is
exogenously given, the evolution of firm distribution is endogenously de-
termined. Therefore, we cannot solve p(z) in the dynamic model period by
period as in the static model. The time path of p(z) for every time period
has to be solved simultaneously.
Firstly, we solve the individual optimization problem for a typical in-
dividual with initial choices of x(0), z(0) and an initial capital stock k(0)
taking the price function of the vertically differentiated goods, i.e. the time-
varying paths of b(t) and d(t) in the price function p(z(t), b(t), d(t)) =
b(t)z(t)d(t), as given. This is because the dynamic price function is jointly
determined period by period, as in the static model, by the interactions be-
tween the producers and consumers of the quality product. As a result, the
price function is out of the reach of each individual and has to be taken as
given. Given the individual optimal path of z(t) and the initial distribution
of z(0) across individuals. We can obtain, for each time t, the distribution of
quantity demanded for quality z – Qd(z, t).
On the other hand, we solve the profit maximization problem of each
individual producer and obtain the distribution of quantity supplied for
quality z – Qs(z, t). Finally, as the market for quality goods z needs to clear
in each period, we equalize Qd(z, t) and Qs(z, t) for all t and solve for the
paths of b(t) and d(t). Using the paths of b(t) and d(t), we can obtain the
evolution of other variables in the model, such as the distribution of x(t)
and z(t).
6.2.1 The Consumer’s Problem: An AK Model with Two Goods
In this subsection, the consumer’s problem in the static model is extended
to a dynamic framework. As in the static model, each individual chooses a
vertically differentiated good by choosing its quality level z and spends the
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rest of his/her total consumption expenditure on a homogeneous good by
choosing the quantity x. The price function of the vertically differentiated
goods is taken as given for each individual as it is jointly determined by the
interactions between all the producers and consumers. For the moment, we
assume the path of the price function is characterized by the paths of b(t)
and d(t). The income of each individual is the capital income generated
by investing capital in an AK technology. This assumption is based on two
considerations. This chapter focuses on how the evolution of consumption
distribution affects the price function of vertically differentiated goods and
hence the allocation of consumption expenditure between the two goods.
Therefore, we try to keep the production side as simple as possible. In ad-
dition, as will be shown below, the simplification also enables us to obtain
closed form solutions for consumption distribution: consumption distribu-
tion always follows the Pareto distribution. Therefore, given the paths of
b(t) and d(t), t ≥ 0, the optimization problem for an individual, whose
initial consumption choices and capital are x(0), z(0) and k(0) respectively,
is:
max
x(t),z(t),k(t)
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt [x(t)
αz(t)β]1−φ
1− φ dt
s.t. k′(t) = Ak(t)− x(t)− b(t)z(t)d(t)
where ρ is the time preference parameter and φ is the constant coefficient of
relative risk aversion. Here the instantaneous utility function is a monotonic
transformation of the Cobb-Douglas utility used in the static model. We use
the transformed utility function to make the dynamic model comparable
with the standard growth model with one good.
The Hamiltonian of the problem is
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H = e−ρt [x(t)
αz(t)β]1−φ
1− φ + λ(t)[Ak(t)− x(t)− b(t)z(t)
d(t)]
FOC with respect to x(t) implies:
∂H
∂x(t)
= 0
eρtαx(t)α−1z(t)β[x(t)αz(t)β]−φ = λ(t) (6.1)
FOC with respect to z(t) implies:
∂H
∂z(t)
= 0
eρtβx(t)αz(t)β−1[x(t)αz(t)β]−φ = b(t)d(t)z(t)d(t)−1λ(t) (6.2)
FOC with respect to k(t) implies:
∂H
∂k(t)
= −λ′(t)
Aλ(t) = −λ′(t) (6.3)
Equation (6.3) can be solved to obtain
λ(t) = C1e−At (6.4)
where C1 is a constant to be determined by initial conditions.
Eliminating λ(t) from Equation (6.1) and Equation (6.2) and expressing
x(t) in terms of z(t) yields:
x(t) =
αb(t)d(t)z(t)d(t)
β
(6.5)
Substituting Equation (6.4) and Equation (6.5) into Equation (6.1) and
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solving for z(t), we can express z(t) as a function of b(t) and d(t):
z(t) = eN[d(t)]tM[b(t), d(t)]{ z(0)
M[b(0), d(0)]
}
N[d(t)]
N[d(0)] (6.6)
where N[d(t)] is function of d(t) and M[b(t), d(t)] is a function of b(t) and
d(t).
Substituting Equation (6.6) into the price function p[z(t), b(t), d(t)] =
b(t)z(t)d(t) yields
p[z(t), b(t), d(t)] = b(t)eN[d(t)]d(t)tM[b(t), d(t)]d(t){ z(0)
M[b(0), d(0)]
}
N[d(t)]
N[d(0)] d(t)
(6.7)
We can also substitute Equation (6.6) into Equation (6.5) to get the ex-
penditure on the homogeneous good x(t):
x(t) =
α
β
d(t)b(t)eN[d(t)]d(t)tM[b(t), d(t)]d(t){ z(0)
M[b(0), d(0)]
}
N[d(t)]
N[d(0)] d(t) (6.8)
Dividing Equation (6.7) by the sum of Equation (6.7) and Equation (6.8)
yields the expenditure share of z
sz(t) =
β
β+ αd(t)
(6.9)
Next, using Equation (6.6) we can show that if the initial distribution of
z follows the Pareto distribution, then it will follow the Pareto distribution
thereafter. We first introduce the following lemma:
Lemma 1 If a random variable x follows the Pareto distribution with pdf f (x) =
kx x
kx
m
xkx+1 , then a power transformation of x, i.e. y = ax
b, also follows the Pareto
distribution with pdf f (y) = ky
y
ky
m
yky+1
with ym = axbm and ky =
kx
b .
Proo f : See Appendix 6.1
From Equation (6.6), we know that for any t > 0, z(t) is a power func-
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tion of z(0). Therefore, every individual’s choice of z at time t z(t) will be
a power transformation of its initial choice z(0), and the power transfor-
mation is the same for everyone. Hence, if the initial distribution of z(0)
follows the Pareto distribution, according to Lemma 1 the distribution of
z(t) will follow the Pareto distribution thereafter. Suppose the initial Pareto
distribution of z(0) is characterized by the two parameters: the lower bound
zm(0) and the shape parameter kz(0), then by Equation (6.6) and Lemma 1,
the distribution of z(t) is characterized by
kz(t) = kz(0)
N[d(0)]
N[d(t)]
(6.10)
zm(t) = eN[d(t)]tM[b(t), d(t)]{ zm(0)M[b(0), d(0)]}
N[d(t)]
N[d(0)] (6.11)
Therefore, the distribution of quantity demanded for quality z can be
obtained by plugging Equation (6.10) and (6.11) into the pdf of z(t):
Qd(z, t) = kz(t)
zm(t)kz(t)
zkz(t)+1
6.2.2 The Producer’s Problem
The producer’s problem in the dynamic model is similar to the one in the
static model. Each producer only lives for one period. The distribution of
the firm is also assumed to be the Pareto distribution, characterized by a
constant parameter Zm and a time-varying parameter kZ(t). Therefore, its
pdf is:
g[t, z(t)] = kZ(t)
Z
kZ(t)
m
z(t)kZ(t)+1
As the producers have no market power and take the price function b(t) and
d(t) as given, each producer’s problem is to maximize its profit by choosing
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the quantity:
max
M
Mp[z(t), b(t), d(t)]− AzMτ[z(t)]γ
FOC with respect to M implies that
M[z(t)] = [
b(t)z(t)d(t)
Azτz(t)γ
]
1
τ−1
Therefore, the distribution of quantity supplied for quality z is given by
Qs(z, t) = g[t, z(t)]M(z(t)) (6.12)
= kZ(t)
Z
kZ(t)
m
z(t)kZ(t)+1
[
b(t)z(t)d(t)
Azτz(t)γ
]
1
τ−1 (6.13)
However, although all firms at equilibrium have the same linear tech-
nology, it can be shown that the total profit for the firm producing the good
with quality z(t) is equal to b(t)
τ
τ−1 A
−1
τ−1
z τ
−τ
τ−1 (τ − 1)z d(t)τ−γτ−1 . It implies that
if d(t)τ−γτ−1 > 0, which is reasonable to assume, then the firm producing a
higher quality good has a bigger size and hence a higher profit. Therefore,
the firm with lower profits has an incentive to learn the technology of pro-
ducing higher quality goods in the long run, although it will incur some
costs by doing this. The value of d(t)τ−γτ−1 is hence an indication of the level
of incentive for firms to change their technology. This chapter assumes that
this value must be equal to some constant at steady state. Any deviation
from this value will lead to changes in the firm distribution, which is due
to the reallocation of firms on the quality dimension driven by higher prof-
its. It is assumed that the firm’s distribution dynamics is governed by the
following equation:
k′Z(t) = −ξ(
d(t)τ − γ
τ − 1 −ω) (6.14)
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where ω is the steady state value of d(t)τ−γτ−1 and ξ is the speed of adjustment.
The implication of this differential equation is that at steady state the power
of z in the profit function is equal to the steady state value, so the cost of
changing quality is equal to the benefit and hence the firm distribution will
stay constant. If the power is greater than the steady state value, some lower
quality good producing firms will have incentives to upgrade their quality,
which results in a lower kZ.
6.2.3 Solving the Market Equilibrium
In the equilibrium, we must have the market clearing condition:
Qs(z(t), t) = Qd(z(t), t)
kZ(t)
Z
kZ(t)
m
z(t)kZ(t)+1
[
b(t)z(t)d(t)
Azτz(t)γ
]
1
τ−1 = kz(t)
zm(t)kz(t)
zkz(t)+1
The LHS can be simplified as
LHS = kZ(t)Z
kZ(t)
m [
b(t)
Azτ
]
1
τ−1 z(t)−[kZ(t)(t)+1]+[d(t)−γ](
1
τ−1 )
Plugging Equation (6.10) and (6.11) into the RHS yields:
RHS =
kz(0)
N[d(0)]
N[d(t)] {eN[d(t)]tM[b(t), d(t)]{ zm(0)M[b(0),d(0)]}
N[d(t)]
N[d(0)] }kz(0)
N[d(0)]
N[d(t)] z(t)−kz(0)
N[d(0)]
N[d(t)]−1
As the power of z(t) on both sides must be the same, we have
kZ(t) = [d(t)− γ]( 1
τ − 1) + kz(0)
N[d(0)]
N[d(t)]
(6.15)
In addition, the constant terms in the LHS and the RHS must be the
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same:
kZ(t)Z
kZ(t)
m [
b(t)
Azτ ]
1
τ−1
= kz(0)
N[d(0)]
N[d(t)] {eN[d(t)]tM[b(t), d(t)]{ zm(0)M[b(0),d(0)]}
N[d(t)]
N[d(0)] }kz(0)
N[d(0)]
N[d(t)] (6.16)
Therefore, Equation (6.15), (6.16) and (6.14) combined with the initial
values kZ(0), kz(0) and zm(0) can determine the paths of b(t), d(t), kZ(t)
and kz(t).
Firstly, setting t = 0 in Equation (6.15) yields:
kZ(0) = [d(0)− γ]( 1
τ − 1) + kz(0) (6.17)
Setting t = 0 in Equation (6.16) implies that
kZ(0)Z
kZ(0)
m [
b(0)
Azτ
]
1
τ−1 = kz(0)[zm(0)]kz(0)
from which we can obtain the initial value b(0).
Given the initial values kZ(0) and kz(0), d(0) can be obtained by sub-
stituting these values into Equation (6.17). Using d(0) and Equation (6.15)
and (6.14), we can solve the paths of kZ(t) and d(t). Substituting the path of
d(t) into Equation (6.10) yields the path of kz(t). Finally, using the paths of
kZ(t), d(t) and Equation (6.16), we can solve the path b(t).
6.2.4 The Isomorphism between the Model and an AK Model with
Time-varying Preference
This subsection shows that the AK model with two goods but with fixed
preference parameters is isomorphic to an AK model with a one-good time-
varying preference. The individual optimization problem in the one-good
model is
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max
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtut(c(t))dt
s.t. k′(t) = Ak(t)− c(t)
where ut(c(t)) = η(t)
c(t)1−θ(t)
1−θ(t) ; θ(t) and η(t) are exogenous; A is the param-
eter of the linear AK technology; θ(t) = 1− (α + βd(t))(1− φ) and η(t) =
(( αβd(t))
αb(t)−
β
d(t) ( αβd(t) + 1)
−(α+ βd(t) ))(1−φ)(α+ βd(t)).
The transversality condition for the above dynamic problem is given by
lim
t→∞ k(t)exp(−At) = 0
The Hamiltonian of this problem is:
H = e−ρtut(c(t)) + λ(t)[Ak(t)− c(t)]
FOC with respect to c(t) implies
∂H
∂c(t)
= 0
e−ρtu′t(c(t)) = λ(t) (6.18)
FOC with respect to k(t) implies
∂H
∂k(t)
= −λ˙
or
A = −
˙λ(t)
λ(t)
(6.19)
Macroeconomics Implications 123
As c(t) = p[z(t), b(t), d(t)] + x(t) and p[z(t), b(t), d(t)] = sz(t)c(t),
ux[x(t), z(t)] = αx(t)α−1−αφz(t)β−βφ
= α[c(t)(1− sz(t))]α−1−αφ[ c(t)sz(t)b(t) ]
β−βφ
d(t)
Using the expression of η(t) and θ(t), it can be shown that
ux(x(t), z(t)) = η(t)c(t)−θ(t) = u′t(c(t))
Therefore, equation (6.18) and (6.19) are exactly the same as the two
FOCs derived when using the direct utility function, i.e. Equation (6.1) and
(6.4). The same FOCs will generate the same aggregate dynamics, which
proves the isomorphism between the two models.
6.2.5 Transitional Dynamics
The theoretical prediction about inequality, growth and inflation can be in-
vestigated by studying the transitional dynamics. All the parameters apart
from ρ, A, φ, ω and ξ are the same as in the static model. There is no direct
evidence on the choices of the four parameters mentioned above. Reason-
able values are chosen for them to reflect the main qualitative behavior of
the model.
In addition, for the dynamics of consumption and capital not to explode,
we have to find the initial values of kZ(0), kz(0), zm(0) such that k(t) con-
verges to its steady state value as t → ∞. Our method is to first find the
steady values for k(t) and then use it as the initial condition to solve the
capital accumulation equation backwards in time to obtain the path of k(t).
Using the above initial values and parameters, the result from transitional
dynamics are plotted in Figure 6.1.
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(a) Gini of Consumption and Income (b) Consumption Growth
(c) Inflation
Figure 6.1: Dynamics of the Aggregate Economy
As a negative shock to consumption inequality or income inequality will
change the price function of the differentiated goods and the profit function
for firms, the growth rate of consumption is higher during transition than
at steady state. The intuition is as follows: from inspection of Figure 6.1,
it can be seen that a negative shock on consumption inequality or income
inequality will change the price function of the differentiated goods, making
the convexity of the price function less than its steady state value. As a
result, the marginal utility of a fixed amount of consumption is increasing
during the transition. Due to the intertemporal substitution, the growth
rate of consumption must be higher following a shock than its steady state
value. Hence inflation in the prices of z goods and in aggregate will be
higher since the quality of z goods is not controlled for in the construction
of the inflation index. Therefore, the aggregate dynamics generated by the
model shows that a lower degree of income inequality is associated with
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higher growth and inflation during the transition.
6.3 The Implications: The Mismeasured Quality Corrected for the
Price Level in China
As one of the implications of the dynamic model is that if quality cannot be
perfectly controlled, higher price levels of GDP per capita will be translating
to higher price indexes, the section uses China as an example to show its
empirical relevance. To do so, we compare the actual price index of China
with the price index corrected for the B-S effect. Panel (a) of Figure 6.2 shows
the price index in terms of RMB, which is increasing over time from 1980 to
2009. The time series of RMB exchange rate is shown in Panel (b). In Panel
(c), the actual price index relative the US is plotted, which is decreasing.
This is mainly due to the depreciation of RMB during this period.
To implement the correction, we first estimate the B-S effect each period,
i.e. the elasticity of the price index with respect to GDP per capita. Then
we deduct from the actual price index the B-S effect implied by the increase
in GDP per capita. As the B-S effect is time-varying, we have two versions
of corrections. In the first version of correction, we deduct from the actual
price index the time-varying B-S effect. In the second version, we deduct
the average B-S effect. The comparison of the actual price index and the
corrected price index for China from 1980 to 2009 are shown in Figure 6.3.
On inspection, one can see that quality control problem is a serious prob-
lem as there is a large difference between the actual price index and the ad-
justed price index. For example, in Panel (b) the price index adjusted for the
time-varying B-S effect is only 75% of the actual price index in 2009. In Panel
(c), the price index adjusted for the average B-S effect is around 90% of the
actual price index in 2009, as the B-S effect is increasing over time after 1980.
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In terms of the changes in the price indexes, of the 64.2% rise in the price in-
dex from 1994 to 2010, 35.0% can be attributed to the bias associated with
the B-S effect in Panel (b) and 5.7% can be attributed to the bias associated
with the B-S effect in Panel (c). Although the price index here is the inter-
national price index, given that the quality control problems also persist in
domestic price indexes, it is likely that there may be a large component in
the domestic price index that is needed to be corrected.
We note a second implication related to the comovement of income dis-
tribution and inflation. But many factors that are difficult to control for
affect these variables, so a simple comparison cannot constitute a valid test.
For the sake of completeness, however, we return these comparisons to Ap-
pendix 6.2.
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(a) Actual Price Index in RMB
(b) Exchange Rate
(c) Actual Price Index in US$
Figure 6.2: Actual Price Index: the Case of China
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(a) Actual Price Index in US$
(b) Actual Price Index vs. Price Index Adjusted for Time-Varying B-S Effect
(c) Actual Price Index vs. Price Index Adjusted for Average B-S Effect
Figure 6.3: Actual Price Index vs. Adjusted Price Index: the Case of China
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6.4 Conclusion
As an extension of Chapter 2, this chapter tries to address the question of
how income distribution affects the price level or inflation with one country.
This static model in Chapter 2 is extended to a dynamic one to investigate
the macroeconomic implications of its mechanism. As the quality control
difficulties persist in both international price indexes and domestic price
indexes, just as income distribution matters for the national price level, in-
come distribution can also affect domestic price index and inflation. For
example, in the case of China, there is a large difference between the ac-
tual price index and the price index corrected for the B-S effect, especially
after 1980s. Moreover, empirical evidence from four countries shows that
inflation is positively correlated with the growth of GDP and is negatively
correlated with income inequality. These empirical findings are consistent
with the theoretical prediction from the dynamic model.
In the literature, inflation models are usually based on the Phillips curve
specification, i.e. a positive relationship between inflation and real activity.
The use of aggregate variable on real activity in the Phillips curve speci-
fications implicitly assume a representative agent framework, i.e. the first
moments of these aggregate variables contain sufficient information about
inflation. However, this chapter suggests that other moments of income
distribution, such as income inequality, may contain additional information
about inflation.
Chapter 7
Summary and Conclusion
It has been shown in Chapter 6 that another macroeconomic effect related
to an induced bias in measured price indices. For example, in the case of
China, of the 64.2% rise in the price index from 1994 to 2010, up to 35.0%
can be attributed to the bias associated with the B-S effect.
The focus of this thesis, however, lies with the microeconomics of the
B-S effect. The traditional argument was that the effect was because of the
‘service content’ of traded goods. Here, an alternative view has been devel-
oped: it has been argued that there is a natural split between two groups
of products used in the index: M-group products and S-group products.
The classification is based on nature of output. All products are classi-
fied into ND (non-durable), SD (semi-durable), S (service), IS (individual
service), CS (collective service) and IG (investment goods). The detailed
methodology about this classification can be found in Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (2006). Here, S-group products in-
clude S (service), IS (individual service) and CS (collective service). ND
(non-durable), SD (semi-durable) and IG (investment goods) are classified
as M-group products.
It has been argued that a different type of model is appropriate in the
two cases. For S-group products a model was proposed in Chapter 4 that
reflects the fact that these are almost pure labour services. A fundamental
implication of this model is that the conventional semi-log representation of
the B-S relationship is inappropriate for these goods.
In Chapter 2, and in Chapter 5, a new model appropriate to the M-goods
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was developed. The central idea is that of ‘mismeasured quality’, and this
can be seen as a contribution to the new strand of literature on IO that fo-
cuses on the unavoidable shortcoming of hedonic indices.
The novel implication of this new model is that the form of income dis-
tribution, as measured by the Gini coefficient, should be correlated the na-
tional price level, controlling for per capita income. This implication is con-
sistent with the evidence provided in Chapter 2 and 5.
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Appendix 2
2.1 Proof of Proposition 3
Since τ > 1,
∂p
∂µ
=
β
α
kz+γ 1τ−1
1
Gini+1
2 +
1
τ−1
+ β
> 0
∂p
∂Gini
= µ
−αβ
(α
kz+γ 1τ−1
1
Gini+1
2 +
1
τ−1
+ β)2
kz + γ 1τ−1
(
1
Gini+1
2 +
1
τ−1)2
1
2(Gini)2
< 0
Therefore,
ep,µ =
∂p
∂µ
µ
p
> 0
ep,Gini =
∂p
p
∂Gini
=
∂p
∂Gini
1
p
< 0
That is the elasticity of the average price level of the z goods with respect to
per capita income is positive and its semi-elasticity with respect to income
inequality is negative. Q.E.D.
Appendix 2 137
2.2 Proof of Proposition 4
∂p
∂µ∂Gini
=
−αβ
(α
kz+γ 1τ−1
1
Gini+1
2 +
1
τ−1
+ β)2
kz + γ 1τ−1
(
1
Gini+1
2 +
1
τ−1)2
1
2(Gini)2
< 0
According to Young’s theorem, ∂p∂µ∂Gini =
∂p
∂Gini∂µ . Therefore, the absolute
value of ∂p∂Gini is increasing in µ. And
∂p
∂µ is decreasing in Gini. Q.E.D.
2.3 Proof of Proposition 5
Given the definition of the aggregate price level as the Paasche index,
PP = 1
αd
αd + β
+
p
p0
β
αd + β
.
= (1− β
αd + β
) +
µ
β
αd+β
µ0
β
αd0+β
β
αd + β
. (A.2.1)
we have
∂PP
∂µ
= (
β
αd + β
)2
1
µ0
β
αd0+β
> 0 (A.2.2)
∂PP
∂Gini
=
β
(αd + β)2
α
∂d
∂Gini
+
µ
µ0
β
ad0+β
β2(−2)(αd + β)−3α ∂d
∂Gini
= [
αβ
(αd + β)2
− 2 µ
µ0
β
αd0+β
αβ2(αd + β)−3] ∂d
∂Gini
= [1− 2
µ
β
αd+β
µ0
β
αd0+β
]
αβ
(αd + β)2
∂d
∂Gini
(A.2.3)
Hence, the impact of per capita income on the Paasche index is positive
while the impact of income inequality on the Paasche index depends on
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the country’s income distribution relative to the base country, i.e. the U.S..
∂PP
∂Gini for different combinations of per capita income and income inequality
using the value of parameters from Table A.2.1 is plotted in Figure A.2.1.
It can be seen that the sign of ∂PP∂Gini crucially depends on the level of per
capita income. With low per capita income, income inequality has a positive
impact on the national price level. On the other hand, with high per capita
income, income inequality will have a negative impact on the national price
level.
Table A.2.1: Calibration
Baseline specification
α = 0.1 share of homogeneous goods
β = 0.9 share of differentiated goods
e = 1 elasticity of substitution
Az = 1 productivity parameter
τ = 2 quantity elasticity of production cost
γ = 2 quality elasticity of production cost
kc = 2.1667 power parameter in Pareto distribution of income
cm = 24621 minimum income
kz = 2 power parameter in Pareto distribution of quality
zm =
√
2
2 minimum quality
Moreover,
∂PP
∂µ∂Gini
= −2 1
µ0
β
αd0+β
αβ2(αd + β)−3 ∂d
∂Gini
< 0. (A.2.4)
Thus, the effect of per capita income on the aggregate price level (∂PP∂µ ) is
decreasing in income inequality and the effect of income inequality ( ∂PP∂Gini )
is decreasing in per capita income µ.
Since the elasticity of the aggregate price level with respect to per capita
income ePP,µ ≡ ∂PP∂µ µPP has the same sign as
∂PP
∂µ and the semi-elasticity of the
aggregate price level with respect to income inequality ePP,Gini ≡ ∂PP∂Gini 1PP has
the same sign as ∂PP∂Gini , it is easy to show that ePP,µ is positive and the sign
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Figure A.2.1: The Contour of the Effect of Income Inequality on the Paasche
Index ( ∂PP∂Gini ) for Different Combinations of Per Capita Income and Income
Inequality
Notes: The base country income distribution is calibrated using U.S. data in 2003.
of ePP,Gini depends on per capita income of the country in question relative
to the U.S.. With a low enough per capita income ePP,Gini is positive, while
ePP,Gini is negative with a high level of per capita income.
Furthermore,
∂ePP,µ
∂Gini
=
∂[ ∂PP∂µ
µ
PP
]
∂Gini
=
∂PP
∂µ∂Gini
µ
PP
+
∂PP
∂µ
µ
−P2P
∂PP
∂Gini
(A.2.5)
Substituting Equation (A.2.1), (A.2.2), (A.2.3) and (A.2.4) into Equation
(A.2.5), we can obtain
∂ePP,µ
∂Gini
=
µ
PP
∂d
∂Gini
(αd + β)−3 1
µ0
β
αd0+β
αβ2{−2− β
αd + β
[1− 2 P
P0
]
1
PP
}
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Therefore, the condition for
∂ePP ,µ
∂Gini < 0 is
β
αd + β
(2
P
P0
− 1) 1
PP
< 2
Intuitively, we can notice that this condition can be satisfied as long as
the income distribution is not too far away from that of the U.S.. For exam-
ple, when the income distribution of the country in question is similar to
that of the base country, the U.S. , in which case both P
P0
and PP are around
1, the left hand side will be around βαd+β , which is much less than 2.
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Figure A.2.2: The Contour of the Effect of Income Inequality on ePP,µ (
∂ePP ,µ
∂Gini )
for Different Combinations of Per Capita Income and Income Inequality
Notes: The base country income distribution is calibrated using U.S. data in 2003.
To check the sign of
∂ePP ,µ
∂Gini more generally, its value for different com-
binations of per capita income and income inequality is plotted in Figure
A.2.2. The Figure shows that
∂ePP ,µ
∂Gini is negative for all possible combinations
of per capita income and income inequality. Hence, the elasticity of the ag-
gregate price level with respect to per capita income is decreasing in income
inequality. Similarly,
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∂ePP,Gini
∂µ
=
∂[ ∂PP∂Gini
1
PP
]
∂µ
=
∂PP
∂Gini∂µ
1
PP
+
∂PP
∂Gini
−1
P2P
∂PP
µ
=
1
PP
[
∂PP
∂Gini∂µ
− ∂PP
∂Gini
1
PP
∂PP
µ
] = µ
∂ePP,µ
∂Gini
Since
∂ePP ,Gini
∂µ has the same sign as
∂ePP ,µ
∂Gini , the semi-elasticity of the aggre-
gate price level with respect to income inequality is decreasing in per capita
income.
If we define the aggregate price level as the Laspeyres index, then
PL = (1− β
αd0 + β
) +
µ
β
αd+β
µ0
β
αd0+β
β
αd0 + β
= (1− β
αd0 + β
) +
µ
µ0
β
αd + β
(A.2.6)
Therefore,
∂PL
∂µ
=
β
µ0(αd + β)
> 0 (A.2.7)
∂PL
∂Gini
=
µ
µ0
−β
(αd + β)2
α
∂d
∂Gini
< 0 (A.2.8)
∂PL
∂µ∂Gini
=
1
µ0
−β
(αd + β)2
α
∂d
∂Gini
< 0 (A.2.9)
Hence, the impact of per capita income on the Laspeyres index is posi-
tive while the impact of income inequality on the Laspeyres index is nega-
tive. Moreover, the impact of per capita income on the Laspeyres index is
decreasing in income inequality and the impact of income inequality on the
Laspeyres index is decreasing in per capita income.
Since the elasticity of the aggregate price level with respect to per capita
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income ePL,µ ≡ ∂PL∂µ µPL has the same sign as
∂PL
∂µ and the semi-elasticity of the
aggregate price level with respect to income inequality ePL,Gini ≡ ∂PL∂Gini 1PL has
the same sign as ∂PL∂Gini , it is easy to show that ePL,µ is positive and the sign of
ePL,Gini is negative.
Furthermore,
∂ePL,µ
∂Gini
=
∂[ ∂PL∂µ
µ
PL
]
∂Gini
=
∂PL
∂µ∂Gini
µ
PL
+
∂PL
∂µ
µ
−P2L
∂PL
∂Gini
=
µ
PL
[
∂PL
∂µ∂Gini
− ∂PL
∂µ
1
PL
∂PL
∂Gini
] (A.2.10)
Substituting Equation (A.2.6), (A.2.7), (A.2.8) and (A.2.9) into Equation
(A.2.10), we can obtain
∂ePL,µ
∂Gini
=
µ
PL
1
µ0
αβ
(αd + β)2
∂d
∂Gini
[−1+ β
αd + β
µ
µ0
1
PL
]
Therefore, the condition for
∂ePL ,µ
∂Gini < 0 is
β
αd + β
µ
µ0
1
PL
< 1
Intuitively, this condition can be satisfied as long as the income distribution
of the country in question is not far away from that of the base country the
U.S.. For example, when the income distribution is similar to that of the
U.S. , in which case both µµ0 and PL are around 1, the left hand side will be
around βαd+β , which is less than 1.
Appendix 2 143
−0.07
−0.06
−0.05
−0.05
−0.04
−0.04
−0.04
−0.03
−0.03
−0.03
−0.03
−0.02
−0.02
−0.02
Per Capita Income
G
in
i
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5
x 104
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
Figure A.2.3: The Contour of Effect of Income Inequality on ePL,µ (
∂ePL ,µ
∂Gini ) for
Different Combinations of Per Capita Income and Income Inequality
Notes: The base country income distribution is calibrated using U.S. data in 2003.
To check the sign of
∂ePL ,µ
∂Gini more generally, its value for different combi-
nations of per capita income and income inequality is plotted Figure A.2.3.
The Figure shows that
∂ePL ,µ
∂Gini is negative for all possible combinations of per
capita income and income inequality. Hence, the elasticity of the aggre-
gate price level with respect to per capita income is decreasing in income
inequality. Similarly,
∂ePL,Gini
∂µ
=
∂[ ∂PL∂Gini
1
PL
]
∂µ
=
∂PL
∂Gini∂µ
1
PL
+
∂PL
∂Gini
−1
P2L
∂PL
∂µ
=
1
PL
[
∂PL
∂Gini∂µ
− ∂PL
∂Gini
1
PL
∂PL
∂µ
]
=
1
µ
∂ePL,µ
∂Gini
Since
∂ePL ,Gini
∂µ has the same sign as
∂ePL ,µ
∂Gini , the semi-elasticity of the aggre-
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gate price level with respect to income inequality is decreasing in per capita
income. Q.E.D.
2.4 Income Inequality and the National Price Level in the Classic
Model of Vertical Product Differentiation
2.4.1 Model
In the model, the world consists of countries which only differ in their dis-
tribution of disutility from labour. Each country comprises a continuum of
consumers, indexed by ψ, a parameter characterizing the level of disutility
from labour. A consumer uses his/her labour income c to consume a verti-
cally differentiated/quality product, the price schedule of which is taken as
given for each individual. The rest of the income is spent on a commodity
good. The utility maximization problem is given by
max
l,u
U = u(
c− p
px
)− ψl2
s.t. c = l · w
where u is the quality level of the vertically differentiated product and p is
the price level; px is the unit price of the commodity good; w is the wage
rate, l is the labour input.
It is assumed that the commodity good is produced with a simple fixed
proportion technology: one unit of labour produces one unit of output. As-
suming both the commodity good market and the labour market are com-
petitive, the price of the commodity good px is given by marginal cost,
which is equal to the wage rate w. Hence, we can take w = px as the nu-
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meraire and set them equal to 1. The above problem now becomes
max
l,u
U = u(c− p)− ψl2
s.t. c = l
Since c is the gross consumption of commodity i.e. l
U = u(l − p)− ψl2
dU
dl
= u− 2ψl = 0 or l = u
2ψ
(A.2.11)
The utility score of the consumer is
U = u(l − p)− ψl2
= u(
u
2ψ
− p)− ψ( u
2ψ
)2
=
u2
2ψ
− up− u
2
4ψ
=
u2
4ψ
− up
which gives the criterion for choosing a (u, p) offer. The consumer choose
the (u, p) offer that maximizes
u2
4ψ
− up
subject to this being greater than 14ψ (from not buying any quality good).
Now suppose that the lowest quality is 1 and the product can be pro-
duced from one unit of commodity good without any additional cost. More-
over, it is assumed that all qualities are available at the price schedule p(u) =
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un. An individual consumer will choose u∗ to maximize the utility score:
u2
4ψ
− un+1
FOC implies that
u∗
2ψ
= (n + 1)u∗n
u∗ = [2(n + 1)]
−1
n−1ψ
−1
n−1 (A.2.12)
Hence, the price of the optimal choice of product is given by
p(u∗) = [2(n + 1)]
−n
n−1ψ
−n
n−1 (A.2.13)
and by (A.2.11) the corresponding income level is equal to
l =
u∗
2ψ
(A.2.14)
= [2(n + 1)]
−1
n−1 1
2
ψ
−n
n−1 (A.2.15)
Dividing (A.2.13) by (A.2.15) gives the expenditure share on the quality
good:
p(u∗)
l
(A.2.16)
=
[2(n + 1)]
−n
n−1
1
2 [2(n + 1)]
−1
n−1
(A.2.17)
=
1
n + 1
(A.2.18)
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2.4.2 Income Distribution, Expenditure Share and the Disaggre-
gate Price Level
Proposition 6 (Income Distribution and Expenditure Share) Neither per capita
income nor income inequality can affect the expenditure shares of the commodity
good and the quality product.
Proof: The expenditure share of the quality product is equal to 1n+1 , where n
is a parameter in the exogenously given price schedule of the quality prod-
uct p(u) = un. Therefore, neither per capita income nor income inequality
can affect the expenditure share. QED
Proposition 7 (Income Distribution and the Disaggregate Price level) Per capita
income has a positive impact on the average price level of the quality product. Keep-
ing per capita income constant, income inequality has no impact the price level of
the quality product.
Proof: The pdf of the income distribution is assumed to be f (l), l ≤ l ≤ l,
where l and l are the lower and upper bounds of the income distribution.
The per capita income of the income distribution is denoted µl, which is
equal to ∫ l
l
l · f (l)dl
If quality is not controlled for, then the price level of the quality products
p is computed as the total expenditure on the quality products divided by
the total number of units:
p =
∫ l
l l · sh(l) · f (l)dl∫ l
l f (l)dl
From the individual optimization problem, the expenditure share on the
quality product is the same for every individual, which is equal to 1n+1 .
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Therefore, the total expenditure on the quality products is equal to
∫ l
l
l · 1
n + 1
· f (l)dl.
In addition, as there is a unit mass of consumers, if every individual buys
one unit of the quality product, the total number of units is equal to
∫ l
l
f (l)dl = 1
Therefore, the price level of the quality products is
p =
∫ l
l l
1
n+1 f (l)dl∫ l
l f (l)dl
=
1
n + 1
∫ l
l
l f (l)dl =
1
n + 1
µl (A.2.19)
Hence, the price level of the quality products is increasing in per capita in-
come. Moreover, keeping per capita income constant, changes in income
inequality cannot affect the price level of the quality products. QED
2.5 Income Distribution and the Aggregate Price Level
Model prediction: This model predicts the B-S relationship, i.e. a positive re-
lationship between per capita income and the national price level. Control-
ling for per capita income, income inequality has no impact on the national
price level. These are summarized in Proposition 8.
Proposition 8 (Income Distribution and the National Price level) Per capita in-
come has a positive impact on the national price level. Keeping per capita income
constant, changes in income inequality have no impact on the national price level.
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Proof: The national price levelP is the expenditure-share-weighted average
of the price levels of the commodity good and the quality products:
P = 1 · (1− sh) + p · sh (A.2.20)
Substituting sh = 1n+1 and (A.2.19) into (A.2.20) yields:
P =
n
n + 1
+
1
(n + 1)2
µl
Therefore, the national price level is increasing in per capita income µl.
Keeping per capita income constant, changes in income inequality have no
impact on the national price level. QED
The reader who is familiar with the I.O. literature on vertical product
differentiation, in which the number of products is finite, may ask: would
the results be different if the number of products is finite, rather than a con-
tinuum. Intuitively, if seems clear that this would not change the present
results. Suppose now only a finite number of qualities is available. If each
individual’s optimal choice of quality u∗ as shown in (A.2.12) is available,
he/she will choose that quality and spend 1/(n + 1) of expenditure on it.
If that quality is not available, then the individual’s choice will be a quality
product as close to u∗ as available and the expenditure share will be as close
to 1/(n + 1) as possible. On average, there is no systematic deviation of
the expenditure share from 1/(n + 1), which is a constant independent of
income inequality.
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6.1 Proof of Lemma 1
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Since the pdf of x is f (x), the pdf of y is
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which is also a form of the Pareto distribution g(y) = ky
y
ky
m
yky+1
with ym = axbm
and ky = kxb . Q.E.D.
6.2 Implication 2: The Comovement of Income Distribution and In-
flation
This section uses the data from four countries, the U.S., the U.K., Australia
and Sweden to investigate the relationship between inequality, growth and
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inflation to see if the predictions of the dynamic model are consistent with
empirical evidence.
The measure of income inequality is usually sporadic for many coun-
tries; a long term and consistent measure of income inequality is only avail-
able in few countries, such as the U.S., the U.K., Australia and Sweden.
Figure A.6.4, A.6.5, A.6.6 and A.6.7 plot the time series of the income Gini
index and inflation for the four countries.1 In order to show the relationship
between inflation and inequality more clearly, normalized data is also plot-
ted in Panel (b) of each figure. From these figures, we can notice that there is
a striking negative relationship between inflation and income inequality in
all four countries. This observation is confirmed by the simple correlation
between inflation and income inequality as shown in Table A.6.2, where all
the correlations are significantly negative.
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Figure A.6.4: Inflation and Inequality: US 1956-2008
1The U.S. Gini is the family income Gini coefficients from the Current Population Sur-
vey (CPS). The Gini coefficient of the U.K. is the household income Gini from the Institute
For Fiscal Studies (IFS) spreadsheet. The Australian income Gini is based on the income
Gini in Leigh (2005). The Swedish income Gini is household income Gini from Statistics
Sweden.
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Figure A.6.5: Inflation and Inequality: UK 1956-2008
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Figure A.6.6: Inflation and Inequality: Australia 1956-2008
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Figure A.6.7: Inflation and Inequality: Sweden 1975-2008
Table A.6.2: Correlation between Inflation and the Gini Index in the Four
Countries
US UK Australia Sweden
Correlation -0.318 -0.617 -0.755 -0.751
P-value 0.021 0.000 0.000 0.000
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Figure A.6.8: Inflation and the GDP Growth: 1956-2008
In addition, Figure A.6.8 plots the time series of the GDP growth and
inflation for the four countries. On inspection, one can observe that in all the
countries, inflation is positively correlated with the growth of GDP, which
is again confirmed by significantly positive correlation in Table A.6.3
Table A.6.3: Correlation between Inflation and the GDP Growth in the Four
Countries
US UK Australia Sweden
Correlation 0.5669 0.8985 0.5582 0.7553
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
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Therefore, the above evidence from the four countries shows that infla-
tion is negatively correlated with income inequality and positively corre-
lated with the growth of GDP, which is consistent with the predictions of
the dynamic model.
